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ABSTRACT 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is a theory of war in the information age that 
hypothesizes that forces, which exploit networked conditions better than their 
adversaries, will achieve tactical advantage.  Understanding how Network-Centric 
Systems (NCS) that support NCW are acquired is essential for the continued 
development and delivery of systems that are affordable, meet end-user requirements, 
and that can be fielded quickly. 
The Network-Centric Acquisition Process (NCAP) will enable the DoD to deliver 
NCS that are quickly fielded and that leverage the use of leading-edge technologies.  
The NCAP incorporates the systems engineering (SE) approach for system 
design, and also, maximizes the use of industry “best practices.”  The envisioned NCAP 
will use, among other things, a central repository of design information (including 
software, system drawings, etc.) that can be accessed, or pulled, by system development 
teams, and modified to support specific system needs.  The NCAP will use an electronic 
business (e-Biz) marketplace portal where developers and consumers can be “matched-
up” in order to share their products or make needs known, and where NCS evaluations 
are available for review by interested consumers. 
This thesis will clarify network-centric systems acquisition, and explore the 
benefits that the NCAP would provide. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis will describe the current acquisition of network-centric systems, 
explore the benefits that a network-centric acquisition process would provide, and 
provide recommendations on how to improve the acquisition of network-centric systems.  
It will cover a wide swath of information relating to the network-centric world and will 
apply it to a very narrow part of network-centric acquisition, specifically introducing and 
explaining a proposed Network-Centric Acquisition Process (NCAP). 
 
Network-Centricity 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is a theory of war in the information age that 
hypothesizes that forces that exploit networked conditions better than their adversaries 
will achieve tactical advantage.  The Department of Defense (DoD) has been undergoing 
a transformation in the way it develops and acquires Network-Centric Systems (NCS) 
that will support NCW.  Understanding how NCS is acquired and what affects NCS 
acquisition is essential for the continued development and delivery of systems that are 
affordable, that meet user requirements, and that can be fielded quickly. 
 
Department of Defense Acquisition and the Network-Centric Acquisition Process 
The DoD desires to field NCS that leverage the use of “leading edge” 
technologies that are affordable and that meet the warfighter’s needs.  The NCAP 
provides a framework for NCS development and acquisition that ensures that these 
systems use the most up-to-date-technology.  The framework of the NCAP consists of 
several acquisition and development approaches that, when integrated, provide for quick 
fielding of NCS with the benefit of frequent, iterative technology upgrades. 
 
Network-Centric Acquisition Process Framework 
NCAP uses a Systems Engineering (SE) approach for acquisition.  It has metrics 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the process.  NCAP maximizes the reuse of 
components or use of Off-The-Shelf (OTS) components and uses a data repository to 
facilitate reuse of components.  In addition, NCAP comprises a collaborative 
 xxii
development environment, that stimulates innovation through open source and open 
license requirements, and creates an electronic business marketplace where consumers 
and developers can be matched. 
The NCAP incorporates best practices from commercial industry in order to 




NCS are very diverse and can range from a large ship to a small unmanned aerial 
vehicle, but the common thread that makes them network-centric is their ability to 
harness the power of the network to gain information and decision superiority over an 
adversary.  What allows NCS to harness the power of the network is the backbone of 
Information Technology (IT) software. The proposed NCAP provides an efficient and 
effective way to acquire the IT software infrastructure, or network-centric “glue” that 
enables network-centricity. 
The current DoD acquisition system is slow, serial in nature, and delivers large 
“chunks” of capability at once.  The system is expensive, has slow refresh cycles, and 
virtually ensures that processes and systems are stovepiped.  The NCAP provides an 
alternative for faster acquisition by focusing on delivering “better” speed-to-capability, 
while incorporating current DoD network-centric guidance and industry best practices. 
The NCAP framework incorporates metrics that objectively define “better” and 
measure the processes ability to deliver “better” speed and “better” capability.  The 
framework also incorporates industry best practices such as component reuse, 
collaborative environment, open architecture, acquisition data repository, electronic 
business marketplace, and OTS components. 
The implementation of the NCAP will require changes to the existing DoD 







1. Field Test the Network-Centric Acquisition Process 
The primary recommendation of this thesis is that the NCAP should be adopted 
by the DoD for its acquisition of network-centric capabilities.  The adoption of the NCAP 
should be carried out in a small-scale, acquisition environment or prototype venue, and 
then slowly, and iteratively, scaled to larger acquisitions. 
Use NCAP on a small acquisition, be it a test scenario, and then expand if 
successful acquisitions are achieved.   
When implementing the NCAP, it will be important to use the NCAP metrics that 
measure “better” speed-to-capability, Anr (net-ready availability), and “better” capability, 
Aiv (information value availability) as a means to objectively evaluate the acquisition.  
Anr measures the ratio of the Initial Estimated Development Time (DTi) over the 
Capability Development Time (CDT) and can be seen in Equation (1). 
  Equation (1): Anr=DT/CDT, where CDT=(DTc+ TTc +CTc) 
Aiv is the product of the Information Processing Efficiency (IPE) and the 
Delivered Information Value (DIV) and can be seen in Equation (2). 
  Equation (2): Aiv= IPE x DIV 
NCAP framework will likely not be immediately fully operational (i.e. data 
repository, e-Biz marketplace, or development environment working), but this should not 
slow or halt the implementation of the NCAP.  As NCAP framework items become 
operational, they should be incorporated into the operational version of the NCAP. 
 
2. Change the Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 
5000.01 
DoD should implement the recommendations of the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) March 2009 report, Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the 
Acquisition of Information Technology. 
 xxiv
By implementing the DSB recommendations, the DoD will give the NCAP an 
acquisition framework that will enable fast, iterative, and agile acquisition.  
 
3. Create a Network-Centric Data Repository 
The DoD should begin creating a network-centric data repository that employs the 
search and ontology structures of a data repository as described in the report:  Ontology-
based Solutions for Software Reuse. 
The creation of the data repository should begin slowly and on a small scale, and 
will be a challenging and difficult task.  It will require clear and well thought-out 
guidance on how to enter, classify, and store repository items.  The network-centric data 
repository may not be operational until several iterations of the NCAP are complete. 
 
4. Framework of Network-Centric Collaborative Development Environment 
DoD should conduct further studies to determine the best framework to use in the 
network-centric collaborative development environment.  The framework will include the 
development environment to use, the standard software interfaces, the minimum IA 
requirements, and the licensing rights requirements. 
Forge.mil should serve as a model, prototype, or even as the development 
environment to be used when implementing the early versions of the NCAP. 
 
5. Electronic Business Marketplace Structure and Business Rules 
DoD should conduct further studies to determine the best framework to use in the 
electronic business (e-Biz) marketplace.  Although the requirements for the e-Biz 
marketplace were discussed in this thesis, consultation and collaboration with e-Biz 
marketplace industry leaders (eBay and Amazon) could help create an effective DoD e-
Biz marketplace, or prototype, on which to test the NCAP. 
 
6. Network-Centric Acquisition Stakeholder Education and Training 
DoD should use the material in this thesis to create a course that would help 
educate DoD acquisition stakeholders on network-centricity, the DoD acquisition 
process, and the NCAP. 
 xxv
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Network-Centric Warfare is a theory of war in the information age, which 
hypothesizes that forces that exploit networked conditions better than their adversaries, 
will achieve tactical advantage [1].  The Department of Defense (DoD) has been 
attempting to transform the way it develops and acquires network-centric systems (NCS) 
that support network-centric warfare (NCW).  Understanding how NCS are acquired is 
essential for the continued development and delivery of systems that are affordable, meet 
end-user requirements, and that can be quickly fielded. 
The DoD seeks to deliver NCS that are quickly fielded, and that leverage the use 
of leading-edge technologies.  The proposed network-centric acquisition process (NCAP) 
is an enabler for fast, efficient, and effective NCS development.  Using the NCAP, NCS 
would “ride” the technology wave1, have fast development and certification, and rely on 
frequent, iterative technology upgrades. 
The NCAP incorporates the Systems Engineering (SE) approach for system 
design, and also maximizes the use of industry “best practices” such as maximizing the 
reuse of software and subsystems.  The envisioned NCAP will use, among other things, a 
central repository of design information (including software, system architecture 
drawings, etc.) that can be accessed, or pulled, by system development teams, and 
modified to support specific system needs.  The NCAP will use an electronic business (e-
Biz) marketplace portal where developers and consumers can be “matched-up” in order 
to share their products or make needs known, and where NCS evaluations are available 
for review by interested DoD consumers. 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is a complex system that receives inputs 




1 “Ride” the technology wave refers to NCS taking timely advantage of technological advances in 
order to incorporate them into the design and deliver advanced technology to the stakeholders. This helps 
ensure that new fielded technology is not obsolete. 
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actions of other, sometimes very different, organizations, groups, or stakeholders.  The 
DAS goal is to acquire, field, and maintain (life-cycle) a product, or system, that fulfills 
an identified capability need [2]. 
Developing and choosing the “best” product is often a daunting task because 
many decisions must be made to determine if a new system is needed or if an existing 
system meets the requirements, or if modifications to an existing system will be required. 
The decision “trade space” has many external pressures that help the DAS develop the 
acquisition decision.  Ironically, these pressures tend to produce inefficiencies, or sub-
optimization, of the very systems being developed or acquired. 
SE has been an integral part of defense acquisition for many years.  The use of SE 
processes allows for the development of systems where the “end-user’s” requirements are 
effectively elicited and efficiently decomposed into sub-systems that can easily be 
integrated into a valuable and useful product. 
A thorough understanding of how the DAS operates, and the impact of the use of 
SE processes, will benefit all acquisition process stakeholders.  The way DoD acquires 
NCS will be influenced, and changed, after acquisition stakeholders realize the benefits 
that the NCAP will have on NCS acquisition. 
This thesis will explain network-centric systems acquisition, network-centric 
acquisition, provide metrics to describe new NCAP models, and explore the benefits that 
the NCAP would provide. 
A. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS STUDY 
The thesis study benefits the DoD acquisition community because it will 
introduce a revolutionary method for the acquisition of network-centric capabilities by 
the DoD.  The foundations of the NCAP incorporate industry best practices, SE 




                                                
In addition, the original purpose of this thesis was to create the framework for 
network-centric systems engineering course material for Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) network-centric SE students.  Therefore, along with assisting the DoD acquisition 
community, this thesis will assist in network-centric systems engineering education. 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The focus of this thesis is a process by which the DoD can begin acquiring NCS 
efficiently and cost effectively, specifically the NCAP. 
To best describe the NCAP, it is crucial to understand what network-centricity 
entails and what NCS are.  Chapter II of this thesis is devoted to explaining network-
centricity.  It describes the origins of NCW, explains the theory on which it was based, 
gives current DoD instantiations of NCS, and finishes by defining NCS. 
Chapter III gives an overview of Defense Acquisition by giving a detailed 
explanation of the Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and the DAS. 
Chapter IV discusses the SE approach to acquisition.  It gives an overview of SE 
processes, and then maps a generic SE approach to acquisition to the DoD acquisition 
process2. 
With a foundation on NCS, DAS, and SE (in previous chapters), Chapter V 
presents the NCAP.  It gives a description of the NCAP, presents metrics to measure 
network-centric acquisition, describes the framework of NCAP3, and discusses a new 
network-centric acquisition model4. 
Chapter VI summarizes Chapters I–V and presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
2 The DoD acquisition process as described by DoD Directive 5000.01 [3].  
3 The NCAP framework includes component reuse, collaborative development environment, data 
repository, electronic business marketplace, use of off-the-shelf components, and open systems and open 
licensing rights. 
4 This is an acquisition model recommended by the Defense Science Board to replace the model used 
in DoD Directive 5000.01 [3] and discussed in Chapter V. 
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II. NETWORK-CENTRICITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will lay the groundwork for the thesis by describing Network-Centric 
Operations (NCO), Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), Network-Centric Systems (NCS) 
and by discussing the origins of NCW.  NCW is a driver for change in the way modern 
militaries operate and by understanding NCW it is easier to understand the purpose of 
NCS. 
The basic premise of network-centricity stems from the theory that when 
warfighting forces are networked, and understand how to exploit the “network terrain,” 
they can develop an informational “tactical advantage.”5  This only holds true when the 
networked information and data flow are optimized and the warfighters do not suffer 
from information overload.  Situational awareness allows for Blue Forces to achieve 
decision superiority and dominant maneuver6 over their adversaries. 
In this chapter, NCW’s central tenets and their relevancy in the transformation of 
how military forces operate will be discussed.  Metcalfe’s law will also be presented to 
show the advantages of having networked forces, followed by a discussion of current 
network-centricity and the World Wide Web (WWW). 
The Global Information Grid’s (GIG) origins will be discussed, as well as a brief 
description of each DoD Department’s complementary instantiations of the GIG, and the 
GIG’s role as an enabler of NCW. 
Finally, this chapter will examine what is required for the DoD to transform into a 
network-centric enterprise, in light of observations that have emerged since the DoD 
conceived NCW. 
 
5 NCW literature has evolved to recognize that adversaries will certainly be networked. The issue 
becomes taking better advantage of the network than one’s adversary [4] [5]. 
6 Decision superiority, dominant maneuver, and the central tenets of NCW will be discussed later in 
this Chapter, but all stem from the writings of Cebrowski and Garstka [6]. 
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B. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
NCW has many definitions, but the first definition to be presented was originally 
discussed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka in their 1998 article 
“Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future”[7].  According to Cebrowski: 
[NCW] and all of its associated revolutions in military affairs grow out of 
and draw their power from the fundamental changes in American society. 
These changes have been dominated by the co-evolution of economics, 
information technology, and business processes and organizations, and 
they are linked by three themes: 
 The shift in focus from the platform to the network 
 The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a 
continuously adapting ecosystem 
 The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such 
changing ecosystems. [6] 
In Cebrowski’s definition, he talks about the shift from “the platform” to “the 
network,” and what he is implying is the shift from “platform-centric” to “network-
centric” operation.  Simply stated, this means that when a single platform, or multiple 
platforms are networked together, the performance of the combined force is improved.  
This is achieved because networked forces have access to more information, wider 
information reach, and richer information. 
According to John Garstka, 
NCO are military operations that are enabled by the networking of the 
force. NCO provide a force with access to a new, previously unreachable 
region of the information domain. The ability to operate in this region 
provides warfighters with a new type of information advantage, an 
advantage broadly characterized by significantly improved capabilities for 
sharing and accessing information. 
NCW enables warfighters to leverage this information advantage to 
dramatically increase combat power through self-synchronization and 
other network-centric operations. [8] 
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Self-synchronization is achieved by the collectively shared situational awareness 
and refers to the warfighter, or warfighting unit’s ability to continue executing their 
assigned mission even if the top layers of command are lost or disconnected from the 
network.  According to a Naval War College report, 
Self-synchronization facilitates speed of command, the process by which 
forces use information superiority to lock-in success while locking-out 
enemy strategies … In summary, self-synchronization will allow forces, 
empowered by good situational awareness, to recognize and act on a 
situation without further direction. [9] 
The central tenets of NCW are: 
 a robustly networked force improves information sharing 
 information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information and 
shared situational awareness 
 shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization 
and enhances sustainability and speed of command 
 the above , in turn, results in dramatically increased mission effectiveness. 
The central hypothesis of NCW is that a force with these capabilities can increase 
combat power by better synchronizing effects in the battlespace, achieving greater speed 
of command, and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness [10]. 
The link between information domain, information superiority, decision 
superiority, dominant maneuver, different NCW domains, and NCW will be explained in 
the following four sub-sections. 
1. Information Domain and Information Superiority 
Information domain is the domain where information is created, manipulated, and 
shared.  As an example, military Command and Control (C2), warfighter coordination 
and commander’s military intent all reside in the information domain [8]. 
Information superiority is a condition of the information domain that is achieved 
when a warfighter has an information advantage over an adversary.  It can, therefore, be 
stipulated that a networked force, consisting of several platforms, will have informational 
superiority over a non-networked force.  Figure 1 shows how two military aircraft, when 
networked, even though through a tactical link7, are capable of achieving informational 
superiority over a non-networked adversary by an increase in information “richness” and 
“reach.”  This information superiority allows them to operate in the “network-centric” 
region of the information domain, as opposed to the “platform-centric” region. 
According to a DoD report to Congress,  
[NCW] allows the force to achieve an asymmetric information advantage. 
This information advantage is achieved, to a large extent, by allowing the 
force access to a previously unreachable region of the information domain  
− the network-centric region −  that is broadly characterized by both 
increased information richness and increased information reach. [11] 
 
Figure 1.   Information Domain and Effects of Networked Forces (From [11]) 
NCW’s advantage is built upon improved capabilities for information sharing and 
networking that when coupled with improved sensing capabilities can enable a force to 
realize dominance over its adversary. 
                                                 
7 These aircraft were “networked” via a tactical link. Tactical links are serial point-to-point 
connections governed by strict circuit discipline.  In the 21st century the term “network” usually implies a 
many-to-many “cloud” with no circuit discipline whatsoever. 
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2. Decision Superiority 
Informational advantage is achieved when platforms are networked, which gives 
warfighting commanders a competitive advantage over their adversaries.  Commanders 
and their forces are thus able to make better decisions that can be implemented faster than 
the adversary can react.  This is referred to as “decision superiority,” and it provides 
significantly enhanced situational awareness to not only the commander, but to the entire 
force [11]. 
Take the operational example of an air-to-air mission that follows.  Advocates of 
NCW claim that network-enabled information sharing provided aircrews with enhanced 
situational awareness and allowed them to fight smarter and make better decisions faster 
and therefore win more decisively.  However, there are some caveats. By contrast, 
network-centric theory typically considers “networks” to be many-to-many networks 
with unconstrained data flow.  Therefore, while this example clearly illustrates the power 
of decision superiority, it is not clear that superiority resulted from “network enablement” 
or from disciplined information exchange and command and control (C2) (preventing 
information overload enables decision superiority). 
An operational special project conducted by the United States Air Force (USAF) 
in the 1990s demonstrated how pilots flying F-15Cs equipped with tactical data links 
could double mission effectiveness (measured in kill ratios).  Across a broad spectrum of 
engagement scenarios, day/night and ranging from one-on-one to eight vs. sixteen, the 
combination of information and decision-making advantages resulted in a 2.6-fold 
increase in kill ratios. [11] 
3. Dominant Maneuver 
Dominant maneuver is the ability of networked forces to gain positional 
advantage over its adversary with speed and a high operational tempo in the achievement 
of assigned military tasks.  NCW capabilities can support dominant maneuver by 
enabling: 
 Adaptive and concurrent planning 
 Coordination of dispersed units 
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 Status updates of subordinate units 
 Roadmap to mission accomplishment [11] 
A military commander who can achieve dominant maneuver attains a positional 
advantage, that, when combined with decisive combat power, can compel his adversary 
to react from a position of weakness—effectively giving control of the battlespace at a 
time of the commander’s choosing. 
4. Network-centric Warfare Domains 
Effective NCW requires the networking of the three domains of warfare.  Figure 2 
depicts the three domains: 
 Physical domain 
 Cognitive domain 
 Information domain[11] 
a. Physical Domain 
The physical domain consists of the place where military influence is 
desired.  This domain is where platforms interact and where networks connect them.  
Military forces strike, maneuver, and protect the physical domain. 
b. Information Domain 
As defined previously in paragraph B.1, the information domain is where 
information resides.  It is created, shared, and manipulated by its users. 
c. Cognitive Domain 
This domain is in the minds of the warfighters.  The cognitive domain is 
shaped by human perception and nurtured by the information and data supplied by the 
information domain. It is the most difficult to predict and understand and therefore is 
where the personal experience and training of the warfighters can either lift or let settle 
Sun Tzu’s “fog of war”[12]. Situational understanding, awareness, and assessment are 
developed in the cognitive domain. 
These three domains, when properly networked, can enable NCW to occur 
at its most mature form, where: 
 The physical domain is seamlessly connected, 
 The information domain allows for efficient collection, sharing, 
and access to information allowing the warfighting force to 
achieve informational advantage over the adversary, and 
 The cognitive domain allows for shared high quality of situational 
awareness and the ability to self-synchronize. [11] 
 
Figure 2.   Domains of Warfare (From [11]) 
Having defined the different aspects of NCW (information superiority, 
decision superiority, dominant maneuver, and NCW domains) the underlying theory of 
network-centricity will be presented in the next section. 
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C.  METCALFE’S LAW 
NCW advocates the use of Metcalfe’s law to explain the claim that a networked 
force has an advantage over a non-networked force because of the potential value of a 
network. According to Metcalfe (see Figure 3), as the number of nodes in a network 
increases linearly, while the potential “value” or “effectiveness” of the network increases 
quadratically8.  Figure 3 shows how “networked” nodes are more powerful or effective 
when compared to the linear behavior of non-networked nodes. 
 
Figure 3.   Metcalfe’s Law (From [13]) 
Figure 4 portrays a superior information position relative to a competitor (or 
adversary) in military operations.  The three dimensions on the graph are percentage of 
relevance, accuracy, and timeliness.  As 100% relevance, accuracy and timeliness is 
reached in each axis, the upper limit of the information domain is reached.  The “Blue” 
and “Red” forces9 are equivalent, or evenly matched, with the exception that the “Blue” 
force is network-centric.  The network enables information intensive interactions between 
nodes, giving the “Blue” force an advantage over the “Red” force. 
                                                 
8 For every “N” node in a network, there are “N-1” potential interactions between the nodes.  In a 
network of “N” nodes, the total number of potential interactions is: N*(N-1), or N²-N.  Thus, for large 
values of N, the NCW theory claims that the “power” or “effectiveness” is proportional to N² [13]. 
9 “Blue” and “Red” forces are respectively synonymous with allies and adversaries. 
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In the twentieth century, network-centric ideas were profound because they 
predicted the advances that networking forces would provide.  In the twenty-first century, 
they have become self-evident.  Consider the network-centric power the WWW provides. 
Armed with a search engine, anyone with the ability to get on the Internet can tap billions 
of data sources instantly and find more and more useful information than someone off 
line.  Indeed, many enterprises from the world of e-commerce (e.g., iPhone) to the world 
of e-Gov (e.g., eFile tax return services) have leveraged network-centricity to their 
advantage. With respect to NCW, clearly if Blue Forces were “on-line” and Red Forces 
were not, Blue Forces would have instant information superiority because of the 
advantage of being networked with a larger domain of nodes10. 
 
Figure 4.   Superior Information Position Vis-à-vis an Adversary due to Network-
Centricity (From [13]) 
Unfortunately for Blue Force, it is hard to imagine an adversary that does not 
have access to the WWW.  On the contrary, today’s Red Force (e.g. Al Qaeda) has better 
access to “the network,” the WWW, than U.S. Blue Forces who are constrained by ultra- 
restrictive security policies [14] to operate on private military networks with far fewer 
nodes than the WWW.  Clearly, an approach that compares the advantage a networked 
 
 
                                                 
10 This argument assumes that the information that the Blue Forces want is available on the WWW. 
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Blue Force has over a non-networked Red Force is no longer relevant.  Likewise, recent 
history proves that any relevant approach to evaluating the effectiveness of NCW must 
acknowledge that both Blue and Red Forces may not be traditional military actors. 
Twenty-first century experience has also revealed a scale issue associated with the 
Metcalfe’s Law argument. Access to billions of nodes across a network can easily lead to 
information overload, or in other words, make it difficult to find just the right piece of 
information in time to enable a critical decision, i.e. achieve information superiority. 
Therefore, in today’s environment, adversaries will certainly have equal or better 
access to networks of data providers on the one hand.  On the other hand, access to too 
much unfiltered information is counterproductive.  Hence, Blue Force might re-think the 
original NCW premise that the mere availability of more data across a network is 
equivalent to “value” and/or “effectiveness” [15].  The future NCS, of multi-node 
networks, will require automation of information extraction through the use of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) systems.  It is through the automation of information extraction, that 
warfighters can gain information superiority over their adversaries. 
D. THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID AS A NETWORK-CENTRIC 
WARFARE ENABLER 
Joint Vision 2020 highlights the importance of achieving improved capabilities 
for operating in the information domain, and the DoD solution is the GIG.  According to 
Joint Vision 2020, the GIG is: 
…the globally interconnected, end to end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes, and people to manage and provide information on 
demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. [16] 
DoD intends the GIG to be the keystone that will help enable both NCW and 
NCO because of improved information sharing—better information, more of it, and faster 
sharing—amongst all stakeholders, and will lead to improved situational awareness.  The 
GIG’s success will depend on its ability to achieve fully interoperable and interconnected 
forces, a daunting task that is made ever more difficult because of large number of legacy 
systems that aren’t able to be interconnected. 
The GIG hopes to enable information sharing that will provide commanders with 
improved capabilities for C2, for formulating and disseminating commander’s intent 
based on up-to-date situational awareness, and enable the warfighting force to be more 
dispersed, survivable, agile and smaller. 
The role of the GIG in enabling NCW, Information Superiority, and ultimately 
full spectrum dominance is portrayed in Figure 5.  The vision for the GIG is that it will 
dramatically improve information sharing capabilities by leveraging cutting-edge 
information technology to create a network-centric information environment. 
 
Figure 5.   The GIG as an Enabler (From [11]) 
NCW intends to revolutionize the way we conduct warfare and the GIG is the 
“transformation initiative” that will provide the infrastructure required to network the 
forces [11].  In the final analysis, the GIG is all about enabling the flow of information. 
The next four sub-sections will discuss the origins of the GIG, and how 
FORCEnet, LandWarNet, and ConstellationNet all relate to the GIG. 
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1. Origins of the Global Information Grid 
The concept of a “Global Information Grid” was borne out of concerns regarding 
interoperability and end-to-end integration of Automated Information Systems (AIS)11.  
The primary function of the GIG is to support and enable DoD missions, functions, and 
operations [18]. The future GIG will be a System-Of-Systems (SoS)12 that provides a set 
of value-added functions operating in a global context to support processing, storage, and 
transport of information. 
The current version of the GIG is not fully networked, because it is made of many 
smaller networks that have not been (and may not be able to be) networked together.  
Parts of the GIG have many stovepipe systems, with varying degrees of interoperability, 
and whose access to needed information is constrained.  Through a series of capability 
increments, Figure 6 shows how the target GIG’s architectural vision will be achieved 
through a federated13 approach that will ensure coherent transition to the target GIG [18]. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Transformation to “Target GIG” (From [18]) 
2. FORCEnet and the GIG 
According to Rear Admiral Rodriguez, the Chief Engineer for the Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) from 2004 to 2008, “FORCEnet is the 
Navy’s instantiation of the [DoD] GIG” [19].  Rodriguez went on to explain that if the 
                                                 
11 AIS refers to an assembly of computer hardware, software, firmware, or any combination of these, 
configured to accomplish specific information-handling operations [17]. 
12 An SoS is “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” [2]. 
13 Federated, in this context, refers to how the GIG will be networked and viewed as a whole entity by 
its users, and vice separate interconnected networks. 
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GIG were the federal highway system, which connects all the military departments, then 
FORCEnet would be infrastructure that connects that Department of the Navy’s “roads” 
to the GIG.  The users of the transportation system (the GIG) would use the same signal 
and signs (common architecture) to allow for interoperability. 
According to the Naval Network Warfare Command, their definition of 
FORCEnet is: 
The operational construct and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the 
Information Age, to integrate WARRIORS, sensors, networks, [C2], platforms, 
and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the 
spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land…  The future 
implementation of Network Centric Warfare in the naval services. [20] 
3. LandWarNet and the GIG 
According to an information paper published with the 2008 Army Posture 
Statement, [21] “LandWarNet is the Army’s portion of the GIG [22].”  LandWarNet 
consists of infrastructure and services that move information through the Army’s 
network.  It enables the “management and use of warfighting and business information.” 
[22] 
LandWarNet will be the enabler, in conjunction with the GIG, for the Army’s 
achievement of decision superiority and ultimately full spectrum dominance.  It will 
deliver to the warfighter voice, data, and video at the tip of the tactical edge, with the goal 
extending these capabilities to the lowest levels of the Army’s modular force [22]. 
4. C2 Constellation, ConstellationNet and the GIG 
C2 Constellation is the Air Force’s solution to the GIG [23] [24] and will provide 
war fighters access to a globally distributed common knowledge base of shared 
information, providing a consistent level of understanding and situational awareness 
between all war fighting elements [25].  ConstellationNet is the communications 
network—air, space, and terrestrial—that will allow a free flow of information that is 
accessible and presented to warfighters at the right time and right place to achieve the 
commander’s desired effects. 
E. THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID AND FORCE EXECUTION 
As previously stated, the GIG hopes to be the foundation with which NCW’s full 
spectrum dominance can be achieved.  A GIG enabled network-centric force can utilize 
the networks and its processes to achieve full spectrum dominance as forces execute their 
missions.  Figure 7 shows how the GIG connects the network-centric forces, facilitates 
the acquisition of information superiority that is used to make C2 decisions, and allows 
forces to be utilized with the goal of achieving full spectrum dominance. 
 
Figure 7.   Impact of the GIG on NCW (From [11]) 
Information sharing, in a networked environment, enables the network-centric 
forces to gain and exploit information—the right information, to the right people, at the 
right time, and in the right form.  Exploiting information correctly gives the network-
centric-forces information superiority, a situation where there is an imbalance in their 
favor in the information domain.  With information superiority, the force commander can 
influence his C2 by fusing high quality shared information with shared awareness and 
enabling the forces’ collaboration and synchronization.  This culminates in the ability of 
the forces to achieve full spectrum dominance—a competitive advantage across the 
mission spectrum—in the execution of their tasking. 
 18
 19
F. NETWORK-CENTRIC SYSTEMS AND NETWORK-CENTRIC 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CORE 
Network-Centric Systems (NCS) support the concepts presented in this chapter.  
NCS are networked systems that enable warfighters to gain decision superiority over their 
adversaries—better information, faster, and thus allowing quicker reaction. 
An important key attribute of NCS is its ability to deliver valuable information to 
the end-user.  Having too much information causes information overload, so network-
centricity advocates the delivery of Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT).  
Professor Rick Hayes-Roth defines VIRT as follows: 
VIRT is a generic solution to the problem of how to assure that important 
information is passed along and unimportant data is not. The technology 
can be implemented across diverse deployment platforms to meet specific 
requirements. In its most simple configuration a VIRT appliance consists 
of an intelligent monitor that continually examines and interprets data 
sources for Condition Of Interest (COI) events and a condition alerter that 
transmits important events promptly to concerned parties using their 
preferred channels and styles. [26] 
As the DoD transitions toward network-centricity, the systems and SoS that are 
network-centric will collaborate to give the network-centric users the informational 
superiority that will lead to decision superiority and ultimately to full spectrum 
dominance of the adversary.  During the network-centric transition, non-NCS will require 
upgrades to make them network capable and allow them to achieve some limited form 
network-centricity. 
The Network-Centric Systems Engineering (NCSE) core is presented to give a 
background on NCS.  Figure 8 is the NCSE core diagram.  The NCSE core can be 
thought of as a SoS that is made up of four approaches and a core that unites the four 
approaches using communication/networking fundamentals [27].  The four approaches in 
the NCSE core diagram are: 
 Top-down approach of Net-Centric Enterprise Services and Service 
Oriented Architectures (including Communities Of Interest (COI), 
Collaboration, Security, Information Assurance (IA), Discovery, etc.) 
 Bottom-up approach of smart distributed systems, such as smart sensor 
networks, mobile wireless ad-hoc networks, sensor fusion and artificial 
intelligence 
 Middle approach of smart push(publish)/smart pull(subscribe) 
 Side view approach of a disadvantaged user (communications to the 
tactical edge—whether their communications are limited by choice, have 
limited communications capabilities, and/or lack the appropriate security 
levels to communicate, but overall has a need to push/pull 
information/services) 
These four approaches are integrated, or brought together, by fundamentals of 
networking, communications, distributed computing, and real-time processing.  Figure 8 
depicts a tree with four branches symbolizing the network-centric approaches, and the 
trunk symbolizing the integration of these four approaches into a generic NCS. 
 
Figure 8.   Network Centric Systems Engineering Core (From [27]) 
A generic NCS has all four branches and the trunk is networked together in such a 
way that the top-down sub-system is able to share stored information for the NCS to 
operate.  In addition, this generic NCS is able to take organic data and use the bottom-up 
approach to share it with other NCS.  The middle approach is what allows the top-down 
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and bottom-up approaches to effectively pass information throughout the network using 
smart pull/push and AI.  The trunk of the NCSE is the shared “backbone” on which the 
branches are integrated. 
The NCSE core will be discussed again in Chapter V, when it is used to depict a 
generic view of the NCAP. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed NCW, its origins, and how the DoD has shifted to embrace 
and implement the network-centric environment. 
Also discussed was how the information domain is changed when forces are 
networked—network centric vice platform centric.  Networking forces, platforms, or 
capabilities gives warfighters informational and decisional superiority, which enables 
them to maneuver dominantly over an adversary. 
With regard to NCW, the three domains of NCW were presented, which when 
properly networked, would lead to a mature form of NCW where the forces are 
seamlessly connected and have high situational awareness and the ability to self-
synchronize.  Metcalfe’s law was presented to explain how an increase in the number of 
network nodes impacts force effectiveness. 
The GIG was discussed regarding how it will be the foundation on which NCW 
will be built, with the goal of achieving full spectrum dominance in the battlefield (actual 
or virtual14).  Although the GIG is one of many NCS, it is the model through which all 
other NCS will be networked.  NCS were discussed from the view of military services 
and a NCSE core. 
The recent DoD transformation has been based upon the development and/or 




14 Virtual battlefield refers to battles waged on the WWW (cyber-warfare or dispersed command and 
control engagements. 
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fighter in NCW and NCO.  President Bush alluded to his commitment to network-centric 
transformation during his remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy Commencement on May 
25, 2001, when he stated: 
We must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances in the 
technology of war that will allow us to keep the peace by redefining war 
on our terms. I’m committed to building a future force that is defined less 
by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy 
and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry 
and information technologies. [11] 
Although, President Bush’s remarks do not specifically say “network-centric,” the 
context of the speech implied that NCS will allow forces to be smaller, quicker, and self-
synchronous. 
In NCW, the goal is to create a network-centric force that can share and exchange 
information amongst geographically separated units of the warfighting force, regardless 
of platform, service, command structure, or location.  As Garstka stated, “a network-
centric force is an interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured 
information, whenever and wherever needed” [8]. 
Given the minimal progress of the DoD toward its network-centric goals over the 
last decade, it is perhaps time to re-evaluate the network-centric transformation 
approach15. 
After an overview of network-centricity presented in this Chapter, Chapter III will 
give an overview of DoD acquisition, detailing the PPBES, the JCIDS, and the DAS.  
Chapter IV will present SE approach and explain how the SE approach can be mapped 
into the DAS.  Network-centricity is the foundation for the acquisition process to be 
discussed in Chapter V. 
The discussions in this chapter and Chapters III and IV will give the reader the 
required foundation to discuss network-centric as an acquisition process. 
 
 
15 Network-centric transformation approach includes the DoD efforts to become network-centric and 
includes all the efforts it has taken to do so. 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION OVERVIEW  
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to understand network-centric acquisition, a background in DoD 
acquisition is needed.  This chapter will explain how the DoD acquisition system 
operates.  System acquisition is a complex and iterative process that takes a long time to 
complete and requires the interaction of many dispersed stakeholders.  The DoD 
acquisition system, also called Big “A” acquisition process in Figure 9, is comprised of 
the following: 
 Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES); 
 The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); 
 The DoD 5000.2 Acquisition Process, also know as the Little “a” 
acquisition process. 
The interaction between these three processes is fraught with tensions16 that 
create inefficiencies in the acquisition of DoD systems. This chapter will present the 
different stakeholders of the DoD acquisition process and explain how they directly 
impact the acquisition process [2]. 
Together, the three parts of the DoD acquisition system provide an integrated 
approach to strategic planning, identification of needs for military capabilities, systems 
acquisition, and program and budget development [2]. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
Acquisition of programs/systems the DoD needs in order to conduct its missions 
is extremely complex and requires the carful balance of many diverging views, interests, 
needs, and directives. 
 
 
16 The tensions between the processes range from budgetary (Congressional budget process, 
acquisition cost overruns), to determining what the warfighter needs (capability gaps determination). 
At a high level, Figure 9, shows the three overlapping processes that make up the 
DoD’s acquisition system. These processes were intended to work together to help 
acquire the “best” system/product for the DoD, but in reality, effective coordination and 
interaction between the processes is necessary for successful acquisition to occur. 
 
Figure 9.   Two views of the DoD Acquisition System (From [28],[29]) 
In Figure 9, the interaction of these processes is where competing interests are 
amplified, which introduce inefficiencies into the entire “Big A” acquisition process. 
A successful acquisition is described as a system or service whose acquisition 
provides the needed capabilities, at the estimated cost (or with acceptable cost growth), 
and that is delivered in a timely manner. 
The next few sub-sections will discuss the PPBES, the JCIDS, the DoD 5000 
acquisition process, and the operation of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). 
1. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) is one 
of the three decision support processes for DoD acquisition.  It is the process by which 





                                                
In the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) establishes policies, strategy, and prioritized goals for 
the DoD, which are subsequently used to guide resource allocation decisions that balance 
the DoD guidance with Presidential or Congressional fiscal constraints [2]. 
PPBE is based on assessments of the world environment that come from either the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or the National Security Strategy (NSS).  A strategy 
is then developed that takes into account current and future threats, political stances, 
economic situation, technological advances, and resources.  Programs, consisting of 
hardware, human skills, and capabilities are defined in the strategy.  A budget is then 
created to fund the approved programs, which then is executed and reviewed to ensure 
that the intended strategy was achieved [30]. 
The PPBES is iterative; and in theory, it is supposed to be biennial17, but it results 
in an annual budget cycle.  The biennial budgets are supposed to support the 
programming guidance of the PPBE, but due to the constrained budgets and 
unplanned/urgent requirements, also called “fact-of-life changes,” they are not able to 
fully support this guidance. 
The next sub-section discusses the history of PPBES, each phase of the PPBES, 
and the biennial PPBES cycles. 
a. PPBES History 
Robert McNamara, the 8th Secretary of Defense, first introduced the 
PPBS18 as way to systematically analyze defense requirements and produce a long-term, 
program-oriented DoD budget [31]. 
In 1986, Congress authorized biennial budgeting in which the President 
submitted a two-year budget to Congress.  Congress would then appropriate on a yearly 
basis the President’s budget. 
 
17 Biennial budgets are submitted every two years. 
18 At first, it was called the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and later was 
changed to PPBES. 
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b. Planning Phase 
The planning phase establishes the strategic priorities and capabilities 
required to achieve the overarching DoD strategy.  It is a collaborative effort by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DoD Joint Staff.  This phase 
determines the military capabilities that are required, including the force and support 
level objectives to accomplish the mission.  Deliverables from this phase are: Joint 
Strategic Review; National Military Strategy; OSD Planning; and the Strategic/Joint 
Planning Guidance. 
The planning phase begins with clearly articulated and resource-balanced 
national defense policies and military strategy, also known as the Strategic Planning 
Guidance (SPG).  The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) evolves from the SPG, and is 
the link between planning and programming.  The JPG provides guidance to the DoD 
Departments for the development of their program proposal. [2] 
c. Programming 
The programming phase applies resources and funds to programs that 
meet the capabilities required to achieve the strategic priorities.  Resources are allocated 
to support the goals of the SPG and JPG.  This phase is fiscally constrained, and thus the 
DoD is required to prioritize desired programs as it in translates the planning guidance 
into an allocation of forces, manpower, and dollars. 
The programming phase begins with the development of a Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM), by each DoD Department19.  The programming phase 
seeks to construct a set of programs, within fiscal constraints, that respond to the 
guidance and priorities of the JPG. 
The POM provides a comprehensive description of the proposed 




19 The DoD is made up of three Departments (Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the 
Defense Logistics Agency. [32]. 
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manpower—by program, projected six years into the future.  DoD Departments can 
describe important programs that are not fully funded (or not funded at all) in the POM, 
including a risk assessment of what a funding shortfall would cause. 
Senior DoD officials and the Joint Staff review each department’s POM in 
order to integrate them into a coherent and overarching set of DoD programs.  During 
these reviews they can raise issues with selected portions of any department’s POM, or 
any funding shortfalls in the POM, and propose alternatives with adjustments to 
resources.  The SECDEF has the final vote concerning issues not resolved at lower levels, 
and the resulting decisions are documented in the Program Decision Memorandum 
(PDM) [2]. 
d. Budgeting 
The budgeting phase properly prices the programs, develops justifications 
and a budget execution plan.  This occurs concurrently with the programming phase, 
because each branch of service submits a proposed budget estimate together with a POM. 
The budget converts the POM’s programmatic view into the appropriation 
structure used by Congressional, that will include budget justification documents.  The 
office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, USD(C) and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) review each department’s budget estimates.  This 
review ensures that programs are funded in accordance with current financial policies, are 
properly and reasonably priced, and that the budget documentation is adequate to justify 
the programs when presented to the Congress. 
Congressional budget analysts provide the DoD Departments with written 
questions in preparation for formal hearings where the analysts review and discuss the 
budget in detail.  After the hearings, each analyst prepares a decision document (known 
as a Program Budget Decision, or PBD) for the programs and/or appropriations under his 
or her area of responsibility.  The PBD proposes financial adjustments to address any 
issues or problems identified during the budget hearing.  The PBDs are forwarded to the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for decisions and these decisions are then reflected in an 
updated budget submission provided to the OMB. 
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Once each DoD Component’s budget is integrated into the DoD budget, it 
is appended as a part of the President’s Budget request to the Congress [2].  Congress 
must then authorize and appropriate funds for the DoD part of the President’s Budget.  
The authorization and appropriations bills are then sent to the President for signature into 
law. 
e. Execution 
The execution phase performs the approved plan—appropriated funds are 
spent on authorized programs.  Metrics are developed and the budget execution 
performance is assessed to compare actual output versus planned performance for 
defense programs.  Resources are adjusted in order to achieve performance goals [33] 
[34].  If existing program performance goals of a program are not being met, the 
execution review may lead to recommendations to adjust resources and/or restructure 
programs to achieve desired performance goals. [2] 
Execution review occurs simultaneously with the program and budget 
reviews.  This is done to provide feedback concerning the effectiveness of past and 
current resource allocations. 
f. PPBE Biennial Cycles 
In 2003, the DoD adjusted the PPBE, formally known as the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) process, to support a two-year cycle that results in 
biennial budgets. 
Management Initiative Decision (MID) 913, dated May 22, 2003, 
described this process.  The changes were made because the DoD’s process for strategic 
planning, system development and acquisition, and program and budget development 
were not properly integrated.  Although the planning and programming phases imposed 
fiscal discipline, they failed to integrate strategic decisions into a coherent defense 
program [35].  The rationale behind MID 913 was to allow the DoD to improve on 
 
 
budget efforts (planning and execution).  By formulating two-year budgets, the DoD 
could use the “off-year” (odd numbered year) to focus on budget execution and program 
performance [36]. 
 




MID 913 supported submission of a biennial DoD budget that is part of 
the President’s Budget request to Congress for even-numbered Fiscal Years (FY) .  In the 
biennial budget cycle, even-numbered years are called “on-years,” while odd-numbered 
years are called “off-years.”  Figure 10 displays a nominal timeline for the PPBE phases 
in an “on-year” and “off-year.” 
Since Congress provides yearly appropriations to the DoD, the biennial 
budget is in theory submitted on an “on-year” and an amended budget justification is 
submitted for the “off-year,” with fact-of-life changes  to the budget. 
In the “off-year” the DoD departments will not provide revised POMs or 
budget estimates, but will provide Program Change Proposals (PCPs) and/or Budget 
Change Proposals (BCPs) to account for fact-of-life changes.  PCPs and BCPs address 
only single issues and identify resource reductions that will offset any program or budget 
cost growth. 
The PPBES process takes about three years to complete.  As stated earlier, 
all the cycles overlap and thus in June 2009 (see red vertical line in Figure 11) the DoD is 
executing FY09, enacting FY10, and programming FY11. 
 Figure 11.   PPBE System Overlap (From [33]) 
2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the second 
of the three decision support processes for DoD acquisition.  It is governed by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3170.01F, and CJCS Manual 
3170.01C.  The Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG) calls JCIDS “a joint-concepts-centric 
capabilities identification process that allows joint forces to meet future military 
challenges.” 
The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure that the end-user receives 
the capabilities required to successfully execute the assigned missions.  JCIDS is a series 
of top-down analyses, derived from strategic-level guidance, that identifies capability 
gaps20 and a potential solution by assessing existing and proposed capabilities in contrast 
to their contribution to future joint concepts, in the context of integrated architectures of 
                                                 
20 Capability gaps are analyses that take warfighter requirements and determine if an existing system 
can meet that requirement, or if a new solution is required [37]. 
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multiple interoperable systems.  The JCIDS process supports DoD acquisition by 
providing validated capabilities and associated performance criteria to be used as a basis 
for acquiring the right weapon systems and by providing the PPBES with prioritization 
and affordability advice [37].  The capability gaps are addressed by a combination of 
materiel and/or non-materiel solutions21. The recommended materiel solutions, once 
approved, lead to acquisition programs. 
JCIDS encourages collaboration between end-users (the warfighters) and system 
developers (the providers) early in the process.  This improves the ability of many DoD 
organizations to influence what the proposed solutions will be to the capability gaps. 
a. JCIDS Origins and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
The JCIDS process was created to support the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council’s (JROC) strategic requirements to validate and prioritize joint 
warfighting requirements. 
The JROC’s mission is to assist the CJCS in identifying and assessing the 
priority of joint military capabilities (including existing systems and equipment) to meet 
the national military and defense strategies and in considering alternatives to any 
acquisition program by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria.  In 
addition, it ensures that the assignment of capability priorities conforms to and reflects 
projected DoD resource levels, as stated in the JPG.  [38] 
The JROC reviews programs designated as JROC interest and supports the 
acquisition review process in accordance with U.S. Code [38].  The JROC reviews and 
validates all JCIDS documents for Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and IA programs (see 
Table 1) and other programs that are designated as high-interest.  For ACAT ID and IAM 
programs, the JROC reviews and makes recommendations to the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) or Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB). 
 
 
21 Non-materiel solutions would be changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 




Reason for ACAT Designation 
ACAT 1 * Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) with dollar value: more than $365 million 
in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars  
* For procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars 
* Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) designation as special interest 
ACAT 1A * Major Automated Information System  (MAIS): A DoD acquisition program for an 
Automated Information System (AIS) (either as a product or a service) that is either: 
 a) Designated by the MDA as a MAIS; or 
 b) Estimated to exceed: $32 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all expenditures, 
incurred in any single fiscal year; or 
*  $126 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all expenditures, directly related to the AIS 
definition, design, development, and deployment, and incurred from the beginning of the 
Materiel Solution Analysis Phase through deployment at all sites; 
*  $378 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for all expenditures, directly related to the AIS 
definition, design, development, deployment, operations and maintenance, and incurred 
from the beginning of the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase through sustainment for the 
estimated useful life of the system. 
*  MDA designation as special interest 
ACAT II *  Does not meet criteria for ACAT I 
*  Major system 
a) Dollar value: estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for RDT&E of more 
than $140 million in FY 2000 constant dollars 
b) For procurement of more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant dollars  
ACAT III *  Does not meet criteria for ACAT II or above 
*  AIS that is not a MAIS 
Table 1.   Summary of Acquisition Categories (From [39]) 
The JROC is chaired by the Vice CJCS, by delegation from the CJCS [40] 
who also serves as the co-chair of the DAB. The other JROC members are the Vice 
Chiefs of each military service [41]. 
b. JCIDS Process 
The JCIDS process evaluates existing and proposed capabilities in light of 
their contribution to future joint concepts.  JCIDS is supported by robust analytic 
processes and identifies capability gaps and potential solutions. While JCIDS considers 
the full range of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions, the focus remains on the pursuit of 
"materiel" solutions [2]. 
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Figure 12.   JCIDS interaction with Defense Acquisition (From [2]) 
The JCIDS process is initiated through the execution of a Capabilities- 
Based Assessment (CBA).  The CBA is based on high-level military doctrine, such as the 
Joint Operating Concept (JOC) and the Joint Integrating Concept (JIC).  The CBA 
carefully evaluates the required capabilities, compares them to the shortfalls in weapon 
systems and the inherent operational risk, and develops a potential solution for the 
capability shortfall. 
The results of the CBA are documented in a Joint Capabilities Document 
(JCD), or Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), that validate the need for a certain 
capability, and describe a potentially affordable and technically feasible solution [37].  As 
the CBA is refined in an iterative process, the ICD will be incorporated into the 
Capabilities Development Document (CDD), which, in turn, will be incorporated into the 
Capability Production Document (CPD).  Figure 12 shows how the JCIDS process 
interacts with different phases of DoD acquisition. 
 34
 35
3. The Defense Acquisition System—Little “a” Acquisition Process 
The third part of the support process for DoD acquisition is the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS).  DoD Instruction 5000.02 and DoD Directive 5000.01 govern 
the DAS, and it is commonly known as the little “a” acquisition process shown in Figure 
9.  These instructions lay the framework of how the DoD will acquire systems that are 
effective, affordable, and delivered in a timely manner.  The DAS is the management 
process by which the DoD acquires weapon systems and automated information systems. 
The DAS framework provides an event-based process, where acquisition 
programs proceed through a series of milestones associated with significant program 
phases.  It also identifies specific statutory and regulatory reports and other information 
requirements for each milestone and decision point.  A key principle of defense 
acquisition is the use of ACAT (see Table 1), where programs with increasing dollar 
value and management interest are subject to more stringent oversight. 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and Major Automated Information 
Systems (MAIS) are the most expensive acquisition systems and information systems 
programs, as shown in Table 1.  Most MDAP and MAIS are subject to review by senior 
DoD officials, these are normally ACAT 1 or ACAT 1A.  ACAT 1D programs are 
subject to review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, USD(AT&L).  ACAT 1AM programs are MAISs that are reviewed by the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/ DoD Chief 
Information Officer (ASN(NII)/DoD CIO). 
These individuals are the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for their 
respective programs.  The MDA reviews programs and decides if programs will continue 
to move past milestone points [39]. 
4. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 
Figure 13 depicts the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).  The DAS has five 
phases: Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA); Technology Development (TD); Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD); Product and Deployment (PD); and Operations 
and Support (OS). Entrance into the Defense Acquisition Management Systems (DAMS) 
requires a Material Development Decision (MDD).  Each phase has specific entrance and 
exit criteria, which are specified at the MDD or Milestone A, B, or C reviews or once 
production has completed. 
 
Figure 13.   The Department of Defense Acquisition System (From [39]) 
a. Materiel Development Decision 
A MDD is required regardless of what phase of the acquisition process the 
program intends to enter.  The MDD is the formal entry point into the acquisition process 
and is a mandatory step that ensures entry phase decisions are based on approved 
requirements and on a rigorous assessment of alternatives.  The JCIDS process overlaps 
into the DAS at the MDD, where a materiel decision is made. 
The DoD plans a MDD review, with the MDA, when a need for a materiel 
solution is shown.  The MDA examines the ICD and then can approve the guidance from 
the Analysis Of Alternatives (AoA).  The AoA is a study intended to aid decision making 
by illuminating the risk, uncertainty, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
alternatives being considered, to satisfy a mission need [42]. 
Once the MDD is complete, the MDA determines acquisition phase of 
entry (see Figure 14) and documents its decision in an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) [39],[43]. 
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Figure 14.   Materiel Development Decision and Acquisition Entry Phase (From [43]) 
b. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
The purpose of this DAS phase is to assess potential materiel solutions and 
to satisfy the entrance criteria for the Technology Development Phase. 
The MSA phase begins with an approved ICD that has a preliminary 
concept of operations, a description of the needed capabilities, and the program risk.  
Although an ADM was signed for the MDD, this does not mean that a program has been 
initiated22.  In the MSA phase, the DoD component begins to assess preliminary materiel 
solutions, identify key technologies, and estimate life-cycle cost.  This phase culminates 
once the specific exit criteria of the phase have been attained and a materiel solution is 
approved at the Milestone A review [39],[43].  The purpose of the MSA phase is to 
develop materiel solution options for the identified capability need. 
c. Technology Development Phase 
The focus of the TD phase is to reduce technology risk, determine and 
mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, and to 
demonstrate critical technology elements in a prototype. 
                                                 
22 Program initiation normally occurs after the Milestone B review. 
 37
 38
TD is a process of continuous technology discovery and development that 
requires close collaboration between the Science and Technology (S&T) community, the 
end-user, and the system developer.  It is an iterative process designed to assess the 
viability of technologies while simultaneously refining end-user requirements.  If 
technology is found not to be mature, the DoD component can use alternative technology 
that is mature and that can meet the end-user’s needs or engage the user in a dialogue on 
appropriately modifying the requirements. 
A system enters this phase after fulfilling an AoA, with an approved 
materiel solution (done at the Milestone A review), and after being fully funded for the 
technology development phase.  This phase requires competitive prototyping of the 
system or key-system elements as well as a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) that must 
be conducted for the candidate designs.  A PDR report is provided to the MDA with 
recommended requirements trade-offs [43]. 
The Technology Development Strategy (TDS) is a document that is 
drafted during the MSA phase, and finalized during the TD phase.  The TDS documents 
the following:  preliminary acquisition strategy (costs schedule, and performance goals); 
specific cost and schedule; and performance goals for the technology development phase. 
This phase is exited when an affordable program or increment of military 
capability has been identified.  This means that the technology and manufacturing 
processes have been assessed, demonstrated in the applicable environment, 
manufacturing risks have been identified, and the system can be developed within a short 
period of time [43]. 
A Capabilities Development Document (CDD) will be prepared to support 
initiation of the acquisition program.  The CDD builds on the ICD and provides the 
detailed operation performance parameters of the system.  Once a program passes the 
Milestone B, the TD phase is completed and indicates program initiation. 
(1) Preliminary Design Review.  The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
can occur before or after Milestone B review, but that depends on how the TDS or ICD 
are written.  A PDR occurs before Milestone B when this satisfies TD phase objectives, 
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associated prototyping activity and the approved TDS, and if the Program Manager 
(PM23) desires.  The PDR should be conducted at the system level and include end-user 
representatives and certification stakeholders. 
PDR planning is conducted in order to establish the program baseline 
(hardware, software, and human/support systems), underlying architectures and to define 
a high-confidence design.  All system elements (hardware and software) require an 
adequate level of maturity for a successful PDR. 
If PDR is not conducted prior to program initiation, Milestone B, it should 
be done soon after entrance in the EMD phase (see Figure 15). 
Following PDR, the PM submits a PDR report and the MDA conducts a 
formal Post-PDR Assessment.  The PDR report reflects any requirements trades based 
upon the PM’s assessment of cost, schedule, and performance risk [43].  The results of 
the MDA's Post-PDR Assessment are documented in an ADM.  A successful PDR will 
inform requirements trades; improve cost estimation; and identify remaining design, 
integration, and manufacturing risks.  
The Milestone B decision allows the MDA to determine the Low-Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) quantities for MDAPs and major systems [39],[43]. 
 
23 The PM is the DoD designee that supervises the development or acquisition of a system. 
 
Figure 15.   Preliminary Design Review  (From 43]) 
d. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
The purpose of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase is to develop a system or an increment of capability; complete full system 
integration; develop an affordable and executable manufacturing process; ensure 
operational supportability (minimizing the logistics footprint); implement Human 
Systems Integration (HSI); design for producibility; ensure affordability; and demonstrate 
system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility [39]. 
The EMD phase is guided by the CDD, acquisition strategy, Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP), and Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  The emphasis of 
this phase is SE and technical reviews.  The PM may provide a PDR report, if not done 
during the TD phase (see Figure 15) and must provide a Critical Design Review (CDR) 




Figure 15 shows that the EMD phase has two major efforts: Integrated 
System Design; and System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration.  The 
post-CDR assessment, conducted at the end of the Integrated System Design effort, 
allows the MDA to determine if the results of the CDR warrant continuing the phase to 
Milestone C. 
The Integrated System Design effort is intended to define system and SoS 
functionality and interfaces, complete hardware and software detailed design, and reduce 
system-level risk.  The program can enter the System Capability and Manufacturing 
Process Demonstration effort part of this phase upon completion of the Post-CDR 
Assessment and establishment of an initial product baseline. 
The System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration effort is 
intended to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent 
with performance requirements and that the manufacturing processes can support system 
production. 
This effort will end when the system meets approved requirements and is 
demonstrated in its intended environment.  In addition, manufacturing processes have 
been effectively demonstrated, industrial capabilities are reasonably available, and the 
system meets Milestone C entrance requirements.  The completion of this phase is 
dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit to the program at Milestone C or a 
decision to terminate the project [39],[43]. 
e. Production and Deployment Phase 
The purpose of the Production and Deployment (PD) phase is to achieve 
an operational capability that satisfies mission needs.  Operational test and evaluation 
will determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system.  The ADM documents the 




A positive Milestone C decision authorizes entry into LRIP (for MDAPs 
and major systems), into production or procurement (for non-major systems that do not 
require LRIP) or into limited deployment in support of operational testing for MAIS 
programs or software-intensive systems with no production components. 
Full Rate Production (FRP) decision requires demonstrated control of the 
manufacturing process and acceptable reliability in process control data, and the 
demonstrated control and capability of other critical processes.  The beyond LRIP 
decision is based upon the MDA FRP decision review, and documented in an ADM [39]. 
f. Operations and Support Phase 
The purpose of the Operations and Support (OS) Phase is to execute a 
support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance 
requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life-
cycle.   OS has two major efforts, Life-Cycle Sustainment and Disposal [39]. 
g. Evolutionary Acquisition and Recent DoD Acquisition Changes 
Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the end-user. An evolutionary approach delivers 
capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for future capability 
improvements.  It requires a careful balance between available capability and resources, 
and the desire to put that capability in the hands of the user quickly [43]. 
Each capability increment is designed to give additional capabilities to the 
end-user.  When evolutionary strategy is used, the initial delivered capability represents 
only partial fulfillment of the overall capability described in the ICD, and successive 
technology development efforts continue until all capabilities have been achieved. In an 
evolutionary acquisition, the identification and development of the technologies 
necessary for follow-on increments to continue, in parallel with the acquisition of 
preceding increments, allows the mature technologies to more rapidly proceed into the 
EMD Phase.  Each increment of an evolutionary acquisition program will include a 
Milestone A and will have an MDA-approved TDS (see Figure 16) [39]. 
With evolutionary acquisition, increments of capabilities are deployed to 
the end-user in a time-phased basis.  Figure 16 shows the development flow through the 
DAS; it shows how there can be parallel capability development cycles that continually 
improve the capabilities of the systems being developed in the previous development 
increment.  Specifically, as an acquisition transitions from MSA phase, through MS “A” 
review, through the TD phase and MS “B” review, a decision is made by the Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB24) to begin the next increment of capability for the systems. 
 
Figure 16.   Evolutionary Acquisition (From [43]) 
Having discussed the DoD acquisition system, the next section of this chapter will 
discuss how SE has effected the way systems are acquired by the DoD. 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IMPACT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
ACQUISITION  
DoD Instruction 5000.02 specifies that SE be used in the acquisition life-cycle.  It 
claims that “rigorous SE discipline is necessary to ensure that [DoD] meets the 
challenges of developing and maintaining needed warfighting capability.”  Furthermore, 
it requires that SE be “embedded in program planning” [39]. 
                                                 
24 The DAB is the senior advisory board for defense acquisitions in the DoD.  The board’s make up is 
similar to the make up of the JROC and includes the Vice CJCS, the service Secretaries, and a number of 
Undersecretaries of Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the DAS. Members of this board are 
responsible for approving the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) [44]. 
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SE provides a way to integrate the system development processes that will define 
future system performance, cost, schedule, and risk.  As systems become larger and more 
complex, the design, development, and production of a system, or SoS, require the 
integration of numerous activities and processes.  The DoD has recognized the 
importance of using the SE approach in achieving an integrated and balanced system 
solution. [2] 
There are many beneficial impacts that arise from the use of SE for DoD 
acquisition.  They begin with the careful elicitation of end-user requirements that focus 
on designing the right system.  They continue through the diligent integrated product 
design that ensures that the end product will be able to be assembled and that the sub-
systems will correctly interface with each other.  Most importantly, SE allows the PM to 
effectively use the design tradespace to mitigate risks (cost, schedule, performance) in 
order to deliver a product that meets the end-user’s need, is delivered in a timely manner, 
and is affordable.  SE and the SE process will be further discussed in Chapter IV. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed how the DoD acquisition system operates and will be 
the foundation (DoD acquisition) for discussing the need for the NCAP.  The three 
decision support processes for DoD acquisition were briefly presented and explained.  
There are many nuanced inter-relations between the three systems where a small change 
in one can have large impact in one of the others.  If the changes are large enough, it can 
have devastating effects for DoD acquisition (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)).  The 
interaction between these three processes is delicate and if not properly handled can 
create inefficiencies in the acquisition of DoD systems. 
These three processes provide an integrated approach to strategic planning, 
identification of needs for military capabilities, systems acquisition, and program and 
budget development that ultimately are responsible for providing the warfighter with the 
right capability, at the right time, and in an affordable way. 
Chapter IV will discuss the SE approach to acquisition by explaining the SE 
processes. 
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IV. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH TO ACQUISITION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The role of SE is to elicit the needs of the customer25; identify appropriate system 
requirements; develop a system architecture from which to design and build the 
applicable Configuration Items (CI); and integrate the CI to produce a system, or SoS, 
which meets the needs of the customer. 
According to the Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems: 
An SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that results when 
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities. Both individual systems and SoS conform to 
the accepted definition of a system in that each consists of parts, 
relationships, and a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts; 
however, although an SoS is a system, not all systems are SoS. [45] 
SE is involved in each phase in the system or SoS’s life-cycle.  The SE processes 
are applied early in the materiel solution development and then continuously throughout 
the total system life-cycle [2].  The best system solutions are achieved by applying 
established SE processes continuously to the planning, development, and implementation 
of a system or SoS acquisition. 
SE is typically implemented through multi-disciplined teams of subject matter 
experts, who translate user-defined capabilities into operational system specifications 
consistent with cost, schedule, and performance constraints.  SE uses a total life-cycle 
view that encompasses the “cradle to grave” planning.  Since cost to implement system 
changes increases as a product moves further along its life-cycle, the SE approach 
encourages the leverage of early trade-offs in system design. Early identification and 
timely mitigation of system design, schedule, and integration issues reduce overall 
system acquisition cost.  The Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), which is an overarching 
development strategy for the system, should be established early in the system 
development, and be updated as the program matures [2]. 
 
25 In the DoD the customer, end-user, or warfighter is considered the generator of requirements 
because they are the ones that need it. 
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This chapter will present a small sample of different SE processes, define a 
generic SE process (events, phases, and stakeholders), and then describe how the SE 
process is mapped/applied to the DoD acquisition process. 
B SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
There are many different SE approaches that can be used in the DoD acquisition 
process.  Chapter 4 of the Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG) refers to several process 
standards and capability models that describe best practices and processes for conducting 
systems engineering [46].  Some of the process models presented in the DAG are: 
 ISO/IEC 15288, Systems and Software Engineering-System Life-Cycle 
Processes 
 ISO/IEC 12207, Systems and Software Engineering-Software Life-Cycle 
Processes 
 ANSI/EIA 632, Processes for Engineering a System. 
There are many different SE process standards, but they all share a common 
element—the detailed breakdown of system requirements in order to design and create a 
system that meets the customer’s requirements.  The following sub-sections will present 
three well know SE process models, the SE “Vee,” the Waterfall, and the Spiral. 
1. Systems Engineering “Vee” 
The SE Vee, Figure 17, is a graphical representation of the system development 
cycle.  The main steps to be taken for product development are summarized.  The left 
side of the Vee decomposes the requirements and creates system specifications—called 
the project definition. The bottom and right side of the Vee show the build, testing, 
integration, and verification of system components—called the project build, integration 
and test. 
 
Figure 17.   Systems Engineering “Vee” (From [47]) 
2. Waterfall Model 
Figure 18 shows the waterfall model and is more applicable to software 
engineering than to other forms of engineering.  This SE model is a sequential, mostly 
software, development process in which iteration is allowed between adjacent phases.  
The major problem with the waterfall model is that iteration between non-adjacent phases 
occurs too frequently (i.e., between software requirements and detailed design) [47]. 
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 Figure 18.   Waterfall Model of Software Engineering (From [47]) 
 
Figure 19.   Spiral Model (From [47]) 
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3. Spiral Model 
Figure 19 shows the spiral model.  It is primarily a software development process 
model where elements of design and prototyping are combined.  This model combines 
features of the prototyping and waterfall models.  Characteristic of this model is the 
sequential evolution of development cycle phases, where iteration is only allowed 
between adjacent phases.  This process model addressed the need to reduce production 
time. It shortened the time from user requirement definition to the delivery of a useful 
product [47]. 
4. Defense Acquisition Guide’s Systems Engineering Process 
Figure 20 shows the DAG’s SE process (rows of the figure), and it shows how the 
different phases of the SE approach (columns of the figure), used by the DAG, map onto 
the different phases of the DoD acquisition process.  Interestingly, some of the technical 
process phases occur almost concurrently26, where the majority of the level of effort, or 
cost, is done during the same phase of the acquisition process. 
 
Figure 20.   Systems Engineering Technical Processes and the Acquisition Life-Cycle 
(From [46]) 
                                                 
26 For example, Figure 20 shows that Stakeholder Requirements Definition, Requirements Analysis, 
and Architecture Design processes are taking place during the MSA and TD phases of the DoD acquisition 
process. 
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The SE process described in the DAG is similar to the SE “Vee” described in 
Figure 17.  The DAG SE process shows a direct mapping of DAG technical processes to 
the DoD acquisition process timeline (discussed in Chapter III). 
C. MAPPING THE GENERIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH TO 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
In order to map the DoD acquisition processes to the various SE models, a generic 
SE approach is used (discussed in the Appendix).  Figure 21 shows how the generic SE 
approach and types of people that typically work in each phase (as described in the 
Appendix) would be mapped to the DoD acquisition system, discussed in Chapter III, and 
as seen in Figure 13.  This mapping is done to show that the many SE approaches can be 
utilized in a parallel way that complements the DoD Acquisition System framework. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Systems Engineering Process Mapping to DoD Acquisition System (From 
[48]) 
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1. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
In the early phases of system acquisition, the customer, “X”27 type person 
interacts with the sales, marketing, and acquisition personnel, the “A”28 people, to begin 
the system design.  The early system design takes into consideration the technology 
opportunities, schedule and funding constraints, and system performance parameters in 
order to correctly express the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) of the system. 
 
Figure 22.   System Engineering Steps During Materiel Solution Analysis Phase (From 
[46]) 
                                                 
27 From the Appendix, “X” people are the “big picture” thinkers, visionaries, and dreamers.  “X” 
people take the end-user needs, analyze them, and are capable of correctly describing the capability gap—
the need—that requires a materiel solution.  Since they understand the “big picture,” they do not concern 
themselves with the intricate details of the systems they require. 
28 From the Appendix, “A” people interact constantly with the customer, “X” types, thus “A” people 
usually have marketing, business, and detail design experience .  “A” people need to be able to effectively 
communicate with the customer to correctly elicit the system requirements.  “A” people need to also 
interact with “B” people, to make sure what they plan is technically feasible, and therefore “A” people with 
technical backgrounds (typically were a “B” person previously) are more successful. 
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Figure 22 shows the SE process steps (using the SE “Vee”) conducted during the 
MSA phase.  It is interesting to note that each step has a capabilities “trades” process that 
is iterative, where the customer and system developer can modify the design in order to 
make the system better meet the customer’s requirements. 
There are many steps taken during the MSA phase, on the left and downward side 
of the SE “Vee.”  The project team interprets user’s needs (step 1), develops the concept 
performance (steps 2 & 3), and decomposes the concept into components and objectives 
(steps 4 & 5).  On the right and upward side of the SE “Vee,” the system design is 
integrated and analysis is done on enabling components, overall system functionality, 
overall system performance and constraints, and fulfillment of defined user needs (steps 6 
thru 9)[46]. 
a. Materiel Solution Analysis Technical Reviews 
Technical reviews performed during the MSA phase include the Initial 
Technical Review (ITR), which is done at the beginning of the MSA phase, and the 
Alternative System Review (ASR), which is done at the end of the MSA phase.  The ITR 
attempts to ensure that a program’s technical baseline can support a valid cost estimate 
(evaluating cost risk), and assesses the capability needs and materiel solution approach of 
a proposed program. 
The ASR is a technical review that tries to ensure that the elicited set of 
requirements agrees with the customers’ needs and expectations and that the system 
under review can proceed into the Technology Development phase.  The ASR is 
important because it attempts to minimize the number of requirement that will need to be 
changed in later phases.  The ASR should be completed prior to, and provide information 
for Milestone A [46]. 
b. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase Outputs 
Some of the outputs from the MSA phase include: Preliminary System 
Specification; Test and Evaluation Strategy; SEP; and Inputs to draft Capability 
Development Document (CDD) and AoA. 
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2. Technology Development Phase 
Figure 21 shows that in this phase “A” and “B”29 people interact in an attempt to 
mature technologies into an end-system configuration.  This phase determines the 
appropriate set of technologies to be used, conducts competitive prototyping, refines 
requirements, and develops baselines for system configuration. 
According to the DAG, in this phase: 
[SE] processes help mature, prototype, and demonstrate the selected 
system elements and complete the preliminary design of the full system 
for low-risk entry to the [EMD] phase. 
Figure 23 shows the SE related steps that are conducted in the TD phase.  The 
first step (step 1) attempts to interpret the user’s need by using the outputs from the 
previous phase (some being the ICD, CDD draft, material solution, T&E strategy, SEP, 
and TDS).  Additional analysis may be required to ascertain all of the constraints (such as 
operational environment, resource-industrial base, operation and support budgets, system 
fielding date, technology base, and statutory constraints).  Key to the TD effort is 
ensuring that the required technologies are properly matured. 
 
29 From the Appendix, “B” phase people are engineers with technical experience that push the 
technology boundaries with a “can do” attitude that is at times overly optimistic.  “B” people interface with 
“A” and “C”; therefore they need to technically commit to “A” and make sure the plan is feasible for “C” 
people and encourage “C” people that this system is doable (show them the system vision). 
 
Figure 23.   System Engineering Related Steps During Technology Development Phase 
(From [46]) 
The SE process then steps through the development of system performance 
specifications and functional definitions (step 2).  There is analysis and decomposition 
from the capability level to the system level and to the functional level. 
The next two steps (steps 3 and 4) decompose functional requirements into critical 
components by evaluating available technologies so that they can provide the required 
functionality.  Then the system functions are allocated into critical components of the 
systems, that will provide the required functionality.  The requirements trade space will 
be used to maximize fidelity to the system specifications while following program 
constraints and program risk. 
At the bottom of the “Vee” (step 5), system concepts are developed and designed, 
and prototypes are demonstrated that show the viability of the overall system and where 
critical technology maturation should occur. 
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Moving up the “Vee” (steps 6–9), the steps demonstrate: desired capability versus 
component functionality; prototype functionality versus system capability; integrated 
system versus performance specifications; and system concepts and technology maturity 
versus defined user needs.  Based on competitive prototyping efforts adjustments may be 
made to top-level requirements and revision may be made to the cost and schedule 
estimates. 
The last three steps (steps 10–12) of the SE TD phase are the start of the 
Integrated System Design effort, where the system design transitions from system 
concept to an integrated system design.  The PM needs to be mindful and understand the 
KPP of the system and continuously monitor cost, schedule, and performance [46].  
a. Technology Development Phase Technical Reviews 
Technical reviews conducted during this phase include the Prototype 
Preliminary Design Review (PPDR) and the Prototype Critical Design Review (PCDR), 
that support the competitive prototyping efforts and support the technical approach and 
program plans.   
The System Requirement Review (SRR), the first of three reviews used to 
start integrated system design, ensures that the system under review can proceed into 
initial system development by verifying that system requirements are consistent with the 
materiel solution.  According to the DAG: 
The SRR confirms that the user’s operational requirements are sufficiently 
well understood and have been translated into system specific technical 
requirements to permit the developer (contractor) to establish an initial 
system level requirements baseline [46]. 
The System Functional Review (SFR) ensures that the systems’ functional 
baseline is established, and can satisfy the requirements of the CDD.  This review 
assesses the decomposition of the system specification to system functional 
specifications. It completes the definition of items below the system level.  According to 
the DAG: 
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The SFR determines whether the system’s functional definition is fully 
decomposed to its lower level, and that [IPTs] are prepared to start 
preliminary design [46]. 
In addition, the SFR determines whether the system’s lower-level 
performance requirements are consistent with the system concept, and whether lower-
level systems requirements trace to top-level system performance and the draft Capability 
Development Document (CDD). 
The Preliminary Design Review (PDR), according to the DAG, is: 
A technical assessment establishing the physically allocated baseline to 
ensure that the system under review has a reasonable expectation of being 
judged operationally effective and suitable.  The PDR establishes the 
allocated baseline (hardware, software, human/support systems) and 
underlying architectures to ensure that the system under review has a 
reasonable expectation of satisfying the requirements within the currently 
allocated budget and schedule, [46]. 
The PDR determines if the subsystem requirements correctly implement 
the system requirements and it traces subsystem requirements to system design. 
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA), and output of the TD phase, is 
a requirement for regulatory information for all acquisition programs.  The TRA assesses 
the maturity of Critical Technology Elements (CTE). CTE are technologies that are new 
or novel and that a system depends on to meet requirements in development, production, 
or operation.  The TRA is a tool for assessing “program risk and the adequacy of 
technology maturation planning” [46].  The TRA scores the current readiness level of 
developed system elements, using defined Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). 
b. Technology Development Phase Outputs 
Some of the outputs from the TD phase include: TEMP; SEP; TRA; Inputs 
to the CDD and the Acquisition Strategy; and PDR Report. 
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3. Engineering Manufacturing Development Phase 
Figure 21 shows that in the EMD phase “B,” “C”30, and “D”31 people interact in 
attempts to complete the development of a system or increment of capability, reduce 
integration and manufacturing risk, integrate sub-systems, and design for producibility.  
Since it begins after the Milestone B decision this phase is considered the program 
initiation. 
Figure 24 shows the SE process steps in the EMD phase. The SE process attempts 
to complete the integrated system design, any remaining initial system design, and reduce 
system level risk.  Key to this phase is successful performance in integrated tests, 
developmental evaluations, operational assessments, and the use of Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) in T&E. 
The first SE step of this phase finalizes the detailed design of the system by 
evolving the component, or CI, design into system product baseline.  The detailed design 
of the system includes all hardware and software components. 
Step 2 involves the fabrication of hardware components and software coding, 
acquisition of other components (commercial, re-use, etc), and the assembly of the 
components.  If a technology is not mature enough to use in the current iteration of the 
system, an alternate technology is identified, to mitigate the associated risk. 
 
30 From the Appendix, “C” phase people are also engineers. They are experts in the sub-system 
technical areas.  The best “C” phase people often move to work in the  “B” phase. 
31 From the Appendix, The “D” phase people are the leaders from the “A, B, and C” phases that 
understand the sub-systems and how they will interact when integrated into the whole system.  They are 
determined to make the system work and will work night and day to achieve successful systems. 
 Figure 24.   System Engineering Related Steps During the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Phase (From [46]) 
Step 3 evaluates individual CIs by conducting unit testing and evaluation of 
hardware and verification and validation of software.  Components are tested in their 
operational environment.  Risk, cost, and schedule assessments continue as mitigation 
solutions to integration, validation, and verification issues feedback to the refinement of 
the design. 
Step 4 evaluates individual CIs by conducting unit testing and evaluation of 
hardware and verification and validation of software.  Components are tested in their 
operational environment.  Risk, cost, and schedule assessments continue as mitigation 




The next three steps (steps 5–7) conduct integrated tests that verify compliance to 
subsystem specifications, integrated system performance and functionality requirements, 
and integrated system verification against specified operational requirements.  Risk, cost, 
performance, and schedule continue to be monitored.  Any interface and interoperability 
issues for the system are continually addressed, in order to ensure that the system is able 
to achieve its interoperability certification.  These steps confirm that the manufacturing 
processes are under control and any technical risks are mitigated. 
a. Engineering Manufacturing Development Phase Technical 
Reviews 
Technical reviews conducted during the EMD phase include the: Critical 
Design Review (CDR), Test Readiness Review (TRR), Functional Configuration Audit 
(FCA), System Verification Review (SVR), and Production Readiness Review (PRR).   
The CDR is a technical review that establishes the initial product baseline, 
ensuring that the system can satisfy the requirements of the CDD.  A CDR is normally 
conducted for each sub-system, or component, and culminates in a system level CDR that 
approves the product baseline for the entire system.  There are incremental levels of 
CDRs, and they range from component, CI, to system level.  The CDR evaluates the 
proposed “Build To” documentation to determine if it can start initial manufacturing.  
Once the product baseline is established the ability to change life-cycle cost or improve 
performance is reduced. 
The TRR is a review that ensures that the sub-system or system is ready to 
proceed into formal testing.  The TRR verifies the traceability of test requirements to user 
needs and also assesses the system for development maturity, cost, schedule and risk. 
The SVR is a product and process assessment to ensure the system can 
proceed into Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full-Rate Production (FRP).  It 
evaluates cost, schedule, risk, and other system constraints. 
The FCA tests characteristics of CI (hardware and software), attempting to 
verify that actual performance complies with design and interface requirements.  During 
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the FCA, a review of the configuration item’s test/analysis data is conducted to validate 
that the stated function or performance is met.  A successful FCA demonstrates that an 
EMD product is sufficiently mature for entrance into LRIP. 
The PRR determines if the program design is ready for production.  It 
checks if prime contractor and its subcontractors have incurred unacceptable risks that 
affect production (schedule, performance, cost) of the project.  The PRR verifies that 
system requirements are traceable to the final production system.  The PRRs are 
conducted iteratively, and the “final” PRR should occur at the completion of the EMD 
phase and should asses the manufacturing and quality risk as the system proceeds into 
LRIP [46]. 
b. Engineering Manufacturing Development Phase Outputs 
Some of the outputs from the EMD phase include: Product Baseline; Test 
Reports; TEMP; SEP; Inputs to the Capability Production Document (CPD), and Cost 
and Manpower Estimate. 
4. Production and Deployment Phase 
Figure 21 shows that in the PD phase “E”32, “F,” and “G”33 people interact in 
attempts to achieve operational capability of the system in a way that satisfies the mission 
needs.  The FRP Decision Review (FRP DR) separates the LRIP and FRP efforts.  SE 
processes are used to reduce program risk and identify potential management issues in a 
timely manner.  According to the DAG: 
As the integrated components develop into a system, the test and 
evaluation processes frequently reveal issues that require improvements or 
redesign.  As the testing environment more closely approaches that of the 
users needs, the required improvements might be complex and/or subtle 
[46].  
 
32 From the Appendix, “E” phase people like to “clean-up” the system design by documenting 
configurations, developing end-user training documents, and cleaning up design issues.  These people 
usually are writers and enjoy developing documentation, for example training documents, etc. 
33 From the Appendix, “F,” “G,” “H,” “I,” and “J” people are associated with life-cycle support, carry 
out production, ensure maintenance, perform upgrades, provide support, and who plan for retirement and 
disposal of the system. 
Figure 25 shows the SE steps performed during the PD phase.  In the first step, 
known system deficiencies (from all inputs available) are analyzed and a solution is 
proposed.  A plan to build, modify, verify, test, and evaluate the system is formulated. 
The next step takes the proposed solution to the deficiencies and translates them 
into hardware or software specification changes.  Cost, schedule, and performance 
impacts are considered for the designed system, but a retrofit will also be considered 
because production of the system has already begun (system is in LRIP or FRP). 
The last step verifies and validates the proposed changes as they apply to the 
current configuration of the system. 
 
Figure 25.   System Engineering Related Steps During the Production and Deployment 
Phase (From [46])  
a. Production and Deployment Phase Technical Reviews 
Technical reviews conducted during the PD phase include the: Operational 
Test Readiness Review (OTRR); and the Physical Configuration Audit (PCA).  The 
OTRR ensures that the system can successfully proceed into IOT&E, a decision made by 




The PCA is conducted around the time that FRP begins, and it verifies that 
the related design documentation matches what was specified in the contract.  The PCA 
also validates many of the supporting processes (manufacturing, quality control, testing, 
and training) that are used in the system production. 
b. Production and Deployment Phase Outputs 
Some outputs from the PD phase are: Updated Product Baseline; 
Evaluation results from test; TEMP; Life-cycle Sustainment Plan; and SEP. 
5. Operations and Support Phase 
The OS phase executes the support program that sustains the system in a cost-
effective manner over the total life-cycle and eventually disposes of the system. 
The SE process steps in the OS phase support in-service reviews where trade 
studies will be used to determine the best resolution to solve safety, readiness degrading, 
and improvement (modifications and upgrade) issues.   
Figure 26 shows the SE steps performed in the OS phase.  The first step monitors 
and collects service use data.  Since many systems stay in service much longer than 
originally anticipated, operations and support decision will change as operational 
understanding of the system matures.   
Step 2 analyzes data from problems that arise in the fielded system.  As root 
causes are determined, potential solutions are developed.  
The next two steps (steps 3–4) determine the system risk, the hazard probability 
and severity and also develop corrective action.  The corrective actions, mitigation 
measures, can encompass hardware, software, support, materiel, or maintenance changes. 
The next three steps (steps 5–7) integrate and test the corrective action to ensure 
that it solves the issue.  In addition, they assess the risk of the improved system once 
corrective action is demonstrated as effective, and then long-range system ramifications 
and life-cycle costs are addressed. 
 
 
Figure 26.   System Engineering Steps During the Operations and Support Phase (From 
[46])  
a. Operations and Support Phase Technical Reviews 
Technical reviews during the OS phase include the In-Service Review 
(ISR).  The ISR assesses the in-service health of the system.  According to the DAG, it: 
Provides an assessment of risk, readiness, technical status, and trends in a 
measurable form. These assessments substantiate in-service support 
budget priorities [46]. 
b. Operations and Support Phase Outputs 
Outputs of the SE processes in the OS phase include: input to CDD for 





This chapter has presented the SE approach to acquisition.  Several different SE 
processes were discussed, and then a generic SE approach was mapped to the latest 
version of the DoD acquisition process. 
The next chapter will present the Network-Centric Acquisition Process (NCAP) 
and will give a detailed description of the theories on which the NCAP are based, and 
describe how the NCAP will operate. 
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V. NETWORK-CENTRIC ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The Network-Centric Acquisition Process (NCAP) will be presented in this 
chapter.  Chapters I–IV have laid the foundation on which the NCAP will be built: 
network-centric theory, DoD acquisition process, and SE processes. 
NCAP focuses on acquiring the “glue”34 that makes networked systems network-
centric.  NCS range from a ship (LCS) to a large network (the GIG) to an unmanned 
aerial vehicle (e.g., the Predator UAV), the common thread that makes these systems 
network-centric is their ability to harness the power of the network to gain information 
and decision superiority over an adversary. 
NCAP’s goal is to deliver capability quickly to the warfighter, with the promise of 
follow-on fast incremental capability upgrades.  Current DoD acquisition process is serial 
delivers large chunks of capability, it is expensive, has slow refresh cycles, and ensures 
that processes and systems be stovepiped.  NCAP will provide the framework for faster 
acquisition by focusing on speed-to-capability, speed-to-better-capability, Valued 
Information at the Right Time (VIRT), component reuse, and Value Off-The-Shelf 
(VOTS) [49] [26]. 
NCAP is an SE based process where customers and developers work closely 
together to define the requirements, the development of products uses best industry 
practices and is iterative, and the integration of products is done in an environment that 
tests products frequently.  The NCAP, as proposed in this chapter, is not currently used 
by DoD35, but its successful implementation in the private commercial sector36 is one of 
many compelling reasons for its adoption in the DoD. 
 
34 Network-centric “glue” is analogous to the network-centric infrastructure on which the NCS are 
able to achieve information superiority, decision superiority, and full spectrum dominance.  The “glue” is 
the network-centric IT that supports NCS. 
35 The DoD has used aspects of the NCAP in Aegis combat systems software acquisition, but no 
evidence of DoD usage of a NCAP was found during research of this thesis topic. 
36 NCAP has been successfully implemented by Apple Inc. for applications used for the iPhone.  eBay 
and Amazon have also successfully implemented NCAP. 
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The rest of this chapter will discuss the framework of NCAP, and then map the 
NCAP to the NCSE core diagram, which was presented in Chapter II.  Then the chapter 
will describe in detail NCAP’s parts, which include a set of evaluation metrics, 
component reuse, collaborative environment, acquisition data repository, electronic 
business marketplace, and Off-The-Shelf (OTS) components.  Once the framework of 
NCAP is laid out, the last parts of this chapter will present a DAS level acquisition model 
for NCS37. 
A. NETWORK-CENTRIC ACQUISITION PROCESS AND THE NETWORK-
CENTRIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CORE 
The NCSE core diagram was presented in Chapter II, and was used to describe a 
SoS38 that uses four approaches to achieve network-centricity.  The NCSE core diagram 
is a useful way to understand how NCS operate.  It is also useful in understanding how 
the NCSE’s four separate approaches (top-down, bottom-up, middle approach, and 
disadvantaged user), are all integrated by the NCSE core (Networks, distributed 
computing, and real-time processing) into a SoS.  This NCSE core will be used to 
recommend an NCAP framework. 
The NCAP can also be regarded as a SoS that uses several framework approaches 
(data repository, electronic business (e-Biz) marketplace, development environment, etc.) 
that are all integrated to achieve network-centricity for the acquisition process. 
Figure 27 shows the mapping of the NCAP onto the NCSE core diagram.  The 
customer requirements39, component reuse, data repository, e-Biz marketplace, and 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)40 occur in the top-down approach.  The 
network-centric applications created by developers, the development standards, and the 
 
37 This model was developed by the Defense Science Board and recommended to replace the DoD 
Directive 5000.01 model [50]. 
38 NCSE core is a SoS because it is made up of systems that can operate independently, but when 
integrated make the system network-centric.  It could be argued that the top-down, bottom-up, middle, and 
disadvantaged user approach are all systems in the NCSE core, therefore making it a SoS. 
39 Customer requirements refer to the “network-centric” needs. 
40 Government furnished equipment (GFE) is equipment (hardware and/or software) that is made 
available to NCAP developers for their use in innovating and developing network-centric systems. 
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available Government OTS (GOTS) occur during the bottom-up approach.  The push/pull 
of database search information, upload/download database items and e-Biz marketplace 
items, and financial transactions occur in the middle approach.  The network-centric 
applications of non-vetted or non-interfaced developers and OTS components, exist in the 
disadvantaged user approach.  This is because they are not easily able to get access to the 
NCAP, and therefore, acquisition of those network-centric applications is handled 
differently. 
In summary, the recommended NCAP framework will have the following: 
metrics; component reuse; a collaborative development environment; a data repository; 
an electronic business (e-Biz) marketplace; OTS component use; open system and open 
license; and certification and IA processes.  The chapter provides details on elements that 
comprise the NCAP framework. 
  
 
Figure 27.   Mapping of the NCAP to the NCSE core diagram (From [27]) 
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B. ACQUIRING THE NETWORK-CENTRIC “GLUE” 
As discussed in Chapter I, NCS gain their effectiveness from harnessing the 
power of the connected network nodes and support.  Therefore, as the number of nodes 
increase, Blue forces gain decision superiority over an adversary.  Or, as Gunderson 
summarized the traditional NCW hypothesis, “[a] force with the most networked 
connectivity to relevant, timely, and accurate data is the most ‘powerful’ ” [4]. 
Although NCS can be platforms, weapons, sensors, or systems, NCAP will focus 
on acquiring that which makes NCS network-centric, i.e., the network-centric 
Information Technology (IT).  In other words, NCAP is about acquiring the network-
centric “glue” that enables the network and support network-centricity.  “Glue” is the 
integration of all parts in Figure 27. 
C.  NETWORK-CENTRIC ACQUISITION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The DoD is slow in delivering the required capabilities to the end-user, taking 10 
to 15 years to get from program start to component production [51], and thus often 
delivering capabilities to the warfighter that are outdated or obsolete.  This is reinforced 
by Bob Arbetter, Director, Collection Concepts & Strategies, Office of the Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, who said that “slow acquisition equals 
obsolete technology” [52].  In the current warfighing environment that includes the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), it is critical to get up-to-date capabilities to the 
warfighter quickly.  In order for the DoD to deliver leading edge technology to the 
warfighter, it needs to use an acquisition process that delivers needed capabilities faster, 
cheaper, and with frequent refresh cycles.  NCAP is the solution that will change DoD 
acquisition from slow, serial, and massive, to fast, parallel, and incremental. 
The next subsections will describe the qualities needed in the NCAP. 
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1. Fast Acquisition 
NCAP can facilitate fast41 acquisition by leveraging the reuse of existing 
technology, mandating use of “Open Modular Design” products [39] [53] [54], 
encouraging maximal use of Commercial OTS (COTS) products and enabling 
collaborative and open competition. 
2. Parallel Development 
Parallel development, vice serial development, attempts to address and correct the 
inefficient way in which DoD systems have been developed.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
all DoD acquired systems go through the following steps: they are designed; built; tested; 
V&V; and supported throughout the system’s life-cycle.  Current DoD acquisition 
conducts each step in series (e.g., finish design of system, then build, then test, etc.).   
Parallel development advocates implementing short iterative development cycles 
of the system acquisition steps almost in parallel (e.g., at the same time).  Parallel 
development would specifically:  design a segment of the system; build the segment; test 
the segment (e.g., for interoperability); V&V the segment; and develop the life-cycle 
support plan for the segment.  Segments are then integrated incrementally, until the 
system is completed.  Developing products in this way is efficient, because integration 
and testing of the system is conducted continuously throughout the development of the 
system, and therefore, integration and testing issues can easily be corrected with minor 
system modifications. 
3. Incremental Acquisition 
Incremental acquisition prioritizes timeliness of capability delivery over the 
amount of capability delivered.  Incremental acquisition is made a reality by NCAP’s 
frequent upgrade cycles. 
 
41 Fast implies that the acquisition takes less time or less effort to complete.  This statement is made 
with the assumption that the reuse of components, use of “open” products, maximal use of COTS products, 
and encouraging collaborative and open competition will foster an environment of innovation that spurns 
fast and efficient product development. 
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D. NETWORK CENTRIC ACQUISITION PROCESS METRICS 
DoD acquisition is a business, and the business of providing “global security”—
defense systems—is difficult, challenging, and complex, but it is important that it be 
carried out correctly.  The complexities of DoD acquisition are not excuses for bad 
business practices.  In industry, good business practices depend on managing a 
“dashboard”—measuring metrics—that link customer concerns with the processes that 
the enterprise or business can use to address them.  Thus, the NCAP model should focus 
on delivering better capability faster.  That is, not only improving speed-to-capability, but 
also improving the value of the capability delivered.  Hence, the traditional jargon 
“speed-to-capability” becomes “better-speed-to-better-capability.” The NCAP 
“dashboard” then seeks to objectively define, monitor, and adjust “better” with respect to 
required speed, and with respect to required capability. 
The next two subsections will present two metrics that will be used with the 
NCAP. 
1. Better Speed-to-Capability Metric 
The DoD needs a metric to measure how quickly a capability is developed and 
fielded—“better” speed-to-capability.  In the network-centric world, this metric measures 
the speed with which net-ready capabilities are developed. 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines net-ready as a: 
[National Security System (NSS]) that meets required information needs, 
information timeliness requirements, has information assurance 
accreditation, and meets the attributes required for both the technical 
exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of 
that exchange [and] enables [users] to exercise control over enterprise 
information and services through a loosely coupled, distributed 
infrastructure that leverages service modularity, multimedia connectivity, 
metadata, and collaboration to provide an environment that promotes 
unifying actions among all participants. [55] 
Gunderson42 et al. explain that traditional acquisition metrics are called “Key 
Performance Parameters” (KPP).  The KPP traditionally used to define “Sustainability” is 
called “Operational Availability” with shorthand notation of Ao.  They suggest that 
better-speed-to-capability is required to sustain an NCS throughout its life-cycle.  Hence 
they abstract the notion of Ao to define a metric to measure speed-to-capability of net-
ready systems they call Anr43, availability of net-ready capability [56]. 
Gunderson et al. have advocated using Anr as a way to evaluate net-ready 
acquisition process-level Measures Of Effectiveness (MOE).  Anr measures the speed-to-
capability of net-ready acquisitions, providing a metric that focuses on the network-
centric acquisition priority of speed.  
 
Figure 28.   Anr Defined (From [56]) 
 
                                                 
42 Chris Gunderson, Captain (retired) U.S. Navy, is Principal Investigator of the Naval Postgraduate 
School W2COG and Netcentric Certification Office initiatives.  He is also a Research Associate Professor 
in the Department of Information Science at Naval Postgraduate School. 




                                                
Anr measures the ratio of the Initial Estimated Development Time (DTi) over the 
Capability Development Time (CDT).  Figure 28 explains how Anr is calculated and 
defines all of its terms.  A better way to look at the Anr formula is: 
Anr=DTi/CDT, where CDT=(DTc+ TTc +CTc) 
Anr measures the acquisition processes effectiveness at delivering speed-to-
capability.  Better stated, Anr is a measure to compare technology obsolescence rates with 
capability development time, thus allowing the PM manager know if a product will be 
acquired that has obsolete technology44.  Ideally: 
 The Initial Estimated Development Time (DTi) would be perfectly 
accurate, and  
 Testing and Certification (TTc and CTc) would occur perfectly in parallel 
with development. 
In that ideal case, DTi and CDT would be equal and yield an Anr of unity45.  
However, at any given phase of a realistic project, the revised estimate of CDT generally 
becomes larger than the initial development time estimate, DTi.  Therefore, as the 
increment of development progresses, the current calculated value of Anr will likely 
decrease.  If it decreases below a predefined threshold value, the program is in danger of 
missing its speed-to-better-capability goal, and must re-scope the deliverables 
accordingly.  This metric is useful because it gives the PM or acquisition manager the 
ability to objectively evaluate the efficiency of the acquisition process to quickly field 
relevant (leading edge) systems. 
Gunderson et al., suggest notionally that a good target value of CDT should be 
consistent with Moore’s Law—eighteen months.  A good target value for DTi might be 
twelve months—the time it typically takes to field a pure COTS solution across a large 
 
44 The equation itself does not directly address obsolescence rates.  Assuming Moore’s Law—eighteen 
months—is applicable, then the longer it takes to develop a product, the more likely it is that the product’s 
technology will be obsolete. 
45 Even better would be if the revised estimate of Development Time were less than the original 
estimate!  In that case Anr would be greater than one. 
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enterprise.  Those values yield a notional target value for Anr of 0.6646 [56] that  should 
be the threshold value below which a PM should begin to consider alternative acquisition 
plans because the evaluated acquisition will deliver a product that is technologically 
obsolete47. 
The following two examples illustrate how to use Anr to evaluate an acquisition 
decision. 
a. Example One–Threshold Example 
While a PM might set his objective at delivering his capability increment 
within one Moore’s Law cycle of eighteen months, he might set his threshold at twice 
that time.  In that case he might set (DTi) at three years.  He might estimate three years to 
for the current development time (DTc), a year to test it (TTc), and 6 months to certify it 
(CTc).  This results in a net-ready availability of:  
Anr= 3/(3 + 1 + .5) = 0.66 
These values of Anr and CDT are perhaps reasonable thresholds [56]. 
b. Example Two 
Now suppose the same PM experiences delays similar to those of the 
Army’s Future Combat System, say three years.  Originally the PM allocated 3 years to 
develop the system (DTi), a year to test it (TTc), and 6 months to integrate it (CTc).  
Taking into account the expected delay, the following values are entered into the 
equation: DTi= 3 years; DTc= 6 years (3 years original estimate + 3 years of delay); TTc= 
1 year; and CTc= .5 years.  Calculating gives:  We recalculate: 
Anr= 3/(6 + 1 + .5) = 0.4 
 
46 Intuitively, the smaller Anr is, the longer it takes to deliver a capability and the more obsolete the 
technology will be.  The bigger Anr is, the shorter it takes to deliver the capability and the more leading 
edge the technology will be. 
47 Technologically obsolete refers to systems that are more than one generation behind the most up-to-
date technology (e.g., third generation iPod is obsolete because there is a fifth generation iPod on the 
market).  The goal of the Anr metric is to allow the PM to decide if he should continue acquiring a product 
that is technologically obsolete, or change acquisition strategy for a more technologically advanced 
product. 
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Based on which systems or components are available commercially, the 
PM can now objectively prove that his technology is already a generation behind the 
current—cutting edge—technology and will likely deliver obsolete technology.  The PM 
can take action accordingly (i.e., cancel, down scope, deploy pure COTS patch, etc.), 
rather than the acquisition of a system that is obsolete [56]. 
Gunderson et al. recommend that Anr of .66 should be used as a 
benchmark below which a PM should consider other options to deliver the capability 
[56].  The Anr metric can also be used to track the reliability of the specific acquisition to 
deliver a capability before its technology becomes obsolete. 
2. Better Capability Metric 
Although Anr measures speed-to-capability, another metric is needed that 
measures the value of the information delivered by the NCS.  That is we need a metric to 
define “better” capability.  NPS Professor Rick Hayes-Roth has developed an approach 
he calls Valued Information at the Right Time (VIRT) [26]. 
Gunderson et al. suggest that the metric to measure better-speed-to-better-
capability is Aiv, i.e., information value availability, see Figure 29.  This metric is the 
product of the Information Processing Efficiency (IPE) and the Delivered Information 
Value (DIV) [56]: 
Aiv= IPE x DIV 
a. Information Processing Efficiency (IPE) 
IPE is a ratio of the Valued Bits processed (VB) over the Total Bits 
processed (TB) and multiplied by a perishability factor (Wp)48.  Otherwise stated, this 




48 Perishability factor describes a window of utility.  The five-day forecast of a hurricane has a low 
perishability factor, while the pinpoint location of a tornado has a high perishability factor. Wp is a 
subjective value that needs to be carefully assigned by the PM. 
received (TB) and how timely the data was delivered (Wp).  IPE measures the value and 
timeliness of the information, or “how easily and effectively disparate data from disparate 
sources on network(s) are collected and bundled usefully together [57].” 
A good analogy for IPE is a search for “weather forecast for Baghdad, 
Iraq” using google.com.  Ideal IPE would yield a single result (VB = TB, and VB/TB = 
1.0) that would take a fraction of a second to display (Wp=.99)49. 
IPEIdeal Search = (VB/TB)x(Wp) = (1.0)x(.99) = .99 
In a non-network-centric environment, the previous search would yield ten 
valuable results out of ten thousand results (VB/TB = 1/1000 = .001), in a fraction of a 
second (Wp=.99).  Although the results would have a “relevance” ranking and delivered 
in a timely manner, the end-user would have to devote valuable processing time to decide 
which result is the desired one. 
IPENon-Network-Centric Search = (VB/TB)x(Wp) = (.001)x(.99) = .0099 or .01 
Although the above example is simple, it clearly illustrates the power that 
analyzing the IPE of different systems can have on the final decision of what system to 
acquire. 
 
Figure 29.   Aiv Defined (From [56]) 
                                                 
49 Wp=.99 was subjectively chosen, but since it was gathered fast and the information not very 
perishable, a value close to 1.0 was chosen.  Highly perishable information would have a Wp closer to zero. 
 76
 77
                                                
b. Delivered Information Value (DIV) 
DIV measures operational performance (see Figure 29).  Typically DIV is 
represented with traditional military Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) or Measures of 
Performance (MOP) like “Probability of Kill,” “Circular Error Probable,” “Fratricide” 
statistics, etc. For example if the “weather forecast for Baghdad, Iraq” turned out to be 
accurate, it would positively affect the probability of success of a military operational 
mission (where Ps-initial(Military Ops)=.50).  The positive impact of the correct weather 
forecast would increase Ps-initial(Military Ops) say by 10%50 to a Ps-final(Military 
Ops)Ps=0.55.  If there were many factors contributing to the Ps, then the impact on each 
factor (P1, P2, …Pn-1, Pn) would be evaluated individually and then multiplied together to 
give DIV [57]. 
As stated earlier, the Aiv metric is the product of IPE and DIV (see Figure 
29), and could be used to objectively compare different approaches to deliver the 
“network-centric glue” for a particular NCS to determine which delivers the greatest 
information value.  The Anr and Aiv metrics would be of value to many network-centric 
acquisition stakeholders as they evaluate different network-centric systems to acquire.  
These metrics would also useful for evaluating the development status (cost, schedule, 
performance) of a NCS and to decide if the acquisition should be cancelled, modified, or 
extended. 
The next section of this chapter discusses the framework of the NCAP. 
E. NETWORK-CENTRIC ACQUISITION PROCESS FRAMEWORK 
In this section, the framework of the NCAP will be discussed.  Although each part 
of the NCAP framework is presented individually, there is much overlap between the 
different framework parts.  The overlap can be seen in Figure 27. 
The central tenet of the NCAP is to provide not just “better” speed-to-capability 
but “better” speed-to-“better”-capability.  The following sub-sections will describe how 
these are achieved by: maximizing the reuse of components; using a collaborative 
 
50 This example is to show that having the correct information would increase the probability of 
success.  All the probabilities were randomly chosen to illustrate the use of this metric. 
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development environment (where providers innovate and develop); creating a data 
repository that contains all the data on NCS (design, software, hardware design, etc.); 
using an electronic business (e-Biz) marketplace (where customers and developers are 
matched and network-centric products are made available); where OTS product use is 
maximized; where open systems are available for innovation (open source, open 
architecture, and open license); and where developed items meet certification and IA 
standards. 
1. Maximize Reuse of Components 
Maximizing reuse of components is a solution to fast acquisition (speed-to-
capability), but in order to mandate reuse across intellectual property domains, the DoD 
must own purpose rights to the designs and components51.  The reuse of components can 
be seen in the top-down part of the NCAP framework of Figure 27. 
Best practices of software development preach the reuse of software (be it source 
code, objects, or entire software programs) [50] [58].  NCAP framework encourages 
reusing software, systems, and components to the maximum extent possible because it 
reduces the acquisition time, since the reused items already exist and do not need to be 
created. 
In order to facilitate and encourage maximum software reuse, network-centric 
stakeholders will need to define and implement requirements (e.g. standards) for 
network-centric interfaces, interoperability, software security, and development 
environments (e.g. Java, Windows, Flash).  Therefore, the reuse of components that do 
not have standard interfaces, interoperability, and security would not be advocated.  This 
is because the effort required by the developer to make the reused components compliant 
with network-centric standards could require modification that would destroy the cost 
savings that reuse could have afforded. 
 
 
51 A discussion on government purpose rights as they apply to reuse follows later in this Chapter. 
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The current trend in DoD acquisition is to develop systems that use common 
components, that have standardized interfaces, and meet minimum IT security standards 
[46].  As older “legacy” systems are phased out of the DoD inventory, the newer NCS 
and their associated network-centric components (software systems with loose coupling 
and high cohesion) will become easier to reuse.  The ease in reuse will be due to the way 
software systems engineering designs maximize object-oriented programming that allow 
for a developers to “pull” software objects or applications, adapt them, and “plug” them 
into the system they are developing. 
The reuse of components will meet skepticism from many in the DoD and private 
industry.  Most NCS SME consulted for this thesis agreed that reuse of components is 
good and will eventually become a standard practice.  Some SMEs explained that 
developers will find it easier to develop the applications or objects required for the new 
system instead of taking the time to search for the item that can be reused.  The crux of 
mastering the reuse issue—making it easier for developers to reuse network-centric 
components—is to be able to effectively catalog the network-centric components into a 
data repository that catalogs and stores components and allows for efficient search, 
download (“pull”) and use or modification.  The data repository will be discussed in 
detail later in this chapter, in section C.3; the next NCAP framework item discussed is the 
collaborative development environment. 
2. Collaborative Development Environment 
The central idea of the NCAP is to create an environment where network-centric 
products are developed using “best industry practices.”  This development environment 
would use open systems that are interoperable and that are developed in a competitive 
environment52. The idea of a collaborative development environment comes from best 
business practices of public sector companies like eBay, Apple (for iPhone), Google and 
Amazon.  In these collaborative environments, developers have access to the open source 
 
52 Competitive environment refers to an environment like www.eBay.Developer.com where open 
source is made available to all members of the environment, and where they can compete with each other in 
developing a better application for eBay. 
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code, an Application Programming Interface (API)53, and a language specific 
programming environment (Java, Flash, PHP, etc.).  The collaborative development 
environment can be seen in Figure 27 as the integration part of the NCSE core (trunk) of 
the NCAP framework diagram. 
In the collaborative environment, the developer is given standards for application 
functionality, interfaces, and security, but is left to figure out how to improve existing 
systems.  If the application developed (e.g., component, software, systems) is 
successfully tested54, V&V, and provides value to the “end-user” or customers, it is then 
rated in a “consumer reports” style format. 
Interested consumers, or end-users, will read the “consumer reports”55 review on 
available applications, try the applications out, and be able to make an informed decision 
on the purchase or acquisition of the system, component, or application.   
The following sub-section presents an example of a successful development 
environment used in the commercial sector. 
a. eBay Development Web Site 
The eBay development center is a perfect example of the NCAP in use in 
the private sector.  The eBay development site allows developers to use different 
development environments56 to build applications that meet certain eBay specific 
application improvement requirements57.  The user agreements for interface, 
compatibility, security, and coding are made available to the developers—the KPPs are 
clearly spelled out.  The developers create an application that is evaluated for  
 
53 Application programming interface (API) is an interface in computer science that defines the ways 
by which an application program may request services from libraries and/or operating systems. [59]. 
54 Testing refers to any developmental testing and evaluation (DT&E) and operational testing and 
evaluation (OT&E) that is conducted. 
55 This would be a DoD web version of the Consumer Reports magazine published monthly by 
Consumers Union. It publishes reviews and comparisons of consumer products and services based on 
reporting and results from its in-house testing laboratory [60]. 
56 eBay calls the development environments “development centers,” but there are four environments 
that a developer can use to create eBay applications (JavaScript, Flash, PHP, Windows, and Java). 
57 By requirements, eBay has many applications that run on its web site.  Developers are given the 
choice to improve any of the many applications (selling, buying, listing products, etc.) that run on eBay. 
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compatibility and interface requirements, tested, and V&V.  The application is then made 
available to eBay users to test and rate the application and then can either purchase it or 
use it.  If the application is desirable to the end-users, it provides value and has the 
“ilities”58 that end-users desire.  There is a type of “consumer reports” available to the 
consumers that rates the different applications (on a scale of zero to five stars) and makes 
the purchase or use of an eBay developer center application much easier. 
The next part of the NCAP framework discussed is the data repository. 
3. Data Repository 
An important part of the NCAP is the use of a data repository of software, data, 
systems, sub-systems, applications, and components.  The data repository would be an 
open source “virtual library” where vetted developers59 would go and pull items 
(component design, software, programming objects, etc.) and use the pulled items in 
developing systems, subsystems, or applications that meet current identified capability 
gaps.  The data repository can be seen in the top-down part of the NCAP framework of 
Figure 27. 
The data repository would ideally contain information on all DoD systems and 
sub-systems, with the data arranged in an easily searchable semantic and function based 
format.  The data repository would have an advanced semantic search system that would 
facilitate search for items to be reused, or modified. 
One caveat about the data repository is that the DoD generally does not own  
unlimited data rights, or government purpose rights (GPR), to the COTS items it 
purchases.  In order to be able to make COTS items available as “open source” special 
contracts would need to be crafted for that purpose when and if potential return on 
investment warrants.  However, by definition, “COTS” means out-of-the-box 
interoperability across commercial standards.  Hence, it is clear that entering COTS 
 
58 “ilities” refers to availability, reliability, usability, portability, etc.  Reference [61] has a full list of 
system quality attributes. 
59 Vetted developers refers to DoD and private sector personnel who understand the development 
standards (interoperability, security, etc.) of the NCAP and who have developed a trust relationship with 
the DoD. 
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component information into the data repository, regardless of the licensing rights, would 
provide some utility to developers.  GPR will be discussed in a later sub-section of this 
chapter. 
One proponent of the NCAP, Dr. Bob LeFande, suggested that the use of data 
repositories is how modern industries acquire their products.  He stresses that the U.S. 
Government, the DoD, should always own the design data and software, with all 
applicable licensing rights, and therefore be made available to be reused, shared, and 
improved by all stakeholders [62]. 
If the data repository is correctly set up, with a detailed list of available items to 
reuse, and with an efficient search engine, then the data repository would provide VIRT 
to the developers using the repository.  In other words, the same information processing 
methods that support NCW support network centric engineering.  By having a well-
organized data repository with a search capability, the developer would be able to find 
components to reuse quickly (i.e., a high Aiv). 
Otherwise, a poorly catalogued data repository with a mediocre search engine 
would require the developer to spend more time processing data and trying to figure out 
what items to reuse.  If the effort to find reuse items is too large, then the developer could 
choose to create their own item, foregoing the idea of reuse.  Therefore, it is critical to be 
able to efficiently search and find reuse components.  VIRT explains this in the next sub-
section. 
a. Valued Information at the Right Time 
As already discussed in Chapter II, VIRT is a generic solution to the 
problem of how to assure that important information is passed along and unimportant 
data is not [26]. 
Although VIRT was earlier used to describe the effectiveness of NCS, it 
can be abstracted to measure the ability of the NCAP’s data repository to deliver valued 
information to developers of NCS.  Achieving VIRT from the data repository will require 
careful cataloguing, frequent updating, and detailed descriptions (semantic and ontologic) 
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of items entered into the data repository.  In addition, for high-level cataloguing, the data 
repository could be organized by categories, similar to Communities Of Interest (COI), as 
in the Defense Information Security Agency’s (DISA) Netcentric Enterprise Services 
(NCES) [63].  
What follows is an example of a data repository that was created, and 
provided VIRT to its users. 
b. SHARE a Prototype Data Repository 
In 2006, the DoD, under the guidance of Program Executive Officer of 
Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS), established an ontology60 based software 
repository called the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) that facilitated 
the reuse of combat system software and related assets [64].  The framework of the 
repository used two “search” processes consisting of a component specification search 
(based on descriptive entries) and ontology search (based on a conceptual search and its 
relationship to other components). 
The component specification search database catalogued the description of 
the items in the repository, both metadata61 and software behavior descriptions.  The 
metadata provided specific information on how to use the software item, while the 
software behavior component specification complemented the metadata search 
shortcomings by giving behavioral data of the software objects [64]. 
The ontology search process included descriptions of the component’s 
operational relationship that created different perspectives, or contexts, for examining the 
contents of the repository.  The relationships often include the component’s use in the 
existing system and how it mapped to the general system architecture [64]. 
 
 
60  Ontology, in the IT world, is a formal representation of a set of concepts within a domain and the 
relationships between those concepts.  Ontology is used to reason about the properties of that domain, and 
may be used to define the domain [64]. 
61 Metadata is "data about other data,” of any sort in any media. Metadata may include descriptive 
information about the context, quality and condition, or characteristics of the data [64]. 
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The authors of Ontology-based Solutions for Software Reuse, stated that: 
This enriched semantic [or descriptive] specification of the assets in the 
SHARE repository will enable users to more readily find resources that 
meet their needs in their context. [64] 
The reason for creating a data repository is to facilitate VIRT for the reuse 
of components by network-centric developers.  
The ideal NCAP data repository would be a grander instantiation of the SHARE 
repository that would include ontology for all DoD systems and include software, 
hardware, parts, architecture details, and drawings.  The ideal data repository would be 
very onerous to create, difficult to maintain current, and costly to achieve. 
c. Data Repository Way Ahead 
In order for NCAP to begin making data repositories available, a prototype 
data repository model will have to be created, modeled on and use the SHARE repository 
data.  As the NCAP is incrementally implemented throughout the DoD, the data 
repository would grow as NCS objects, elements, and software code would be carefully 
catalogued into the data repository62. 
It will take time to carefully and methodically catalogue and enter NCS 
objects into the data repository.  A standardized procedure for cataloguing and verifying 
the accuracy of entries will need to be developed, by network-centric acquisition 
stakeholders, and articulated to the network-centric acquisition community. 
An incremental and iterative approach to updating and using the data 
repository, should be used, beginning with the cataloging of targeted NCS, and then 
adding systems that will use the NCAP.  Once the data repository is able to provide 
robust search and discovery capabilities, then a mass effort can be undertaken to 
catalogue all DoD NCS. The data repository will continue to grow as more NCS are 
developed using the NCAP. 
 
62 C4ISR legacy equipment and other network-centric software equipment will eventually be uploaded 
into the data repository, but this will not be an NCAP implementation priority. 
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The next section will present the electronic business (e-Biz) Marketplace.  
The NCAP process needs an environment where consumers and developers can be 
matched in order to facilitate the acquisition, product reviewing, and capability-needs 
determination Although the e-Biz marketplace encompasses and uses many of the NCAP 
framework items discussed in this section, it needs to be discussed separately in order to 
fully understand its impact on the NCAP. 
4. Electronic Business (e-Biz) Marketplace  
A thriving market is a place where providers and consumers can effectively find 
each other, form mutually beneficial relationships, and close mutually lucrative 
transactions. The DoD needs a new environment, call it an electronic business (e-Biz) 
marketplace, where developers and consumers can come together for the purpose of 
acquiring and developing network-centric capabilities.  The e-Biz marketplace can be 
seen in the top-down part of the NCAP framework of Figure 27. 
Chris Gunderson, a SME on network-centric acquisition, stated that: 
What’s needed is a net-ready market for continuously improving 
capabilities for sharing information and making better decisions more 
rapidly. In other words, we need an e-market approach to evaluate and 
build network architecture a little bit at a time [5]. 
For consumers of network-centric capabilities, the e-Biz marketplace would be a 
venue where they would be able to search and acquire network-centric products that meet 
their needs.  If the network-centric capabilities do not yet exist, then the e-Biz 
marketplace would match consumer’s needs with developers willing to produce a 
materiel solution to meet their need. 
For developers of network-centric capabilities, the e-Biz marketplace would be 
venue where they would make their network-centric products available for acquisition by 
consumers.  Developers would also be able to efficiently develop NCS for consumers by 
leveraging the utilization of open source equipment/software found in the network-centric 
data repository and by using the open and collaborative development environment of the 
NCAP. 
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Specifically, the e-Biz marketplace would facilitate the following: 
 Finding providers of the needed capability, fellow consumers with similar 
requirements, consumers for the products being offered, and/or partners 
who’s offerings compliment your own—i.e., a dating service (to be 
discussed later in this sub-section) 
 An experimental venue for invention, bundling, T&E and V&V of 
potentially useful capabilities—e.g., SourceForge.net , Java.net63, and 
Forge.mil64 
 A method for evaluating various mature product offerings against each 
other with respect to important considerations– i.e. consumer reports 
 A means to rapidly close transactions, transfer funds, and receive 
capability—e.g., Amazon.com, in addition Existing contract vehicles 
An e-Biz marketplace portal supporting NCAP would provide a great service to a 
global community of distributed65 developers and consumers of network-centric 
processing capability.  The e-Biz marketplace would be an open source and open 
standards capability development arena where developers and consumers are matched, 
new capabilities are evaluated and rated, and where acquisition transactions can occur. 
The following subsections present specific details of the e-Biz marketplace. 
a. e-Biz Marketplace Rules 
NCAP stakeholders will need to develop e-Biz marketplace operation, 
development, and security regulations so that all marketplace users know and are able to 
safely and confidently utilize the e-Biz marketplace. 
The regulations governing the operation of the e-Biz marketplace would 




63 SourceForge.net and Java.net are open source software development sites used for innovative 
development. 
64 Forge.mil is a family of services provided to support the DoD's technology development 
community. The system currently enables the collaborative development and use of open source and DoD 
community source software. 
65 Distributed refers to the ability to be distributed geographically throughout the globe, but connected 
via the NCAP framework. 
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regulations would also include guidance on how the acquisition contracting vehicles 
would operate and incorporate best business practices from the private commercial 
sector. 
b. Matching Consumers and Developer—A Dating Service 
The e-Biz marketplace would provide a service that would bring 
developers and consumers together.  All users of the NCAP would create profiles in the 
e-Biz marketplace domain, and either enter their network-centric requirements66 or their 
capabilities that are available for acquisition, into their profile.  Developers would browse 
a list of unfulfilled network-centric requirements and choose a requirement to develop.  
Customers would browse a list of available network-centric capabilities, and ideally find 
the capability that meets their need, helping implement VIRT into the e-Biz marketplace. 
Although the framework for the “dating service” is not detailed, and only 
presented with great abstraction, the desired outcome is to have a method for matching 
consumers and developers in an efficient and timely manner. 
c. Vetted Developers 
In order to make the e-Biz marketplace work effectively, developers 
would need to pass through a “vetting process” that would certify their ability to comply 
with the development rules and regulations of the e-Biz marketplace.  The vetting process 
would, in essence, be a screening to ensure that the products developed were compliant 
with DoD development standards (e.g., ISO, IA, Security, etc.). 
Vetting developers helps ensure that they are using industry best industry 
practices and maximize the IA compliance (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of 




66 Network-centric requirements, in this context, refers to the capabilities that the customer or end-user 
is looking to acquire. 
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Although this section only gives high level vetting criteria for developers, 
the vetting process would ultimately ensure that only trusted developers are allowed into 
the e-Biz marketplace.  Therefore, developers wanting to participate in the NCAP would 
have to be “certified” (vetted) to become vetted developers. 
d. Financial Transactions 
Although not discussed in this thesis, a series of contract vehicles will 
need to be developed in order to correctly incentivize developers to participate in the e-
Biz marketplace, and therefore in the NCAP.  The contracting vehicles need to be devised 
in a way that they are flexible enough to support the agile NCAP. 
5. Value off-the-Shelf 
Value-Off-The-Shelf (VOTS) is an important part of the NCAP.  OTS67 products 
provide an affordable way to acquire needed capabilities with virtually no development 
time (they are already available and on-the-shelf), and are easy to use (plug and play), 
requiring little personnel training.  OTS can be seen in the bottom-up (for GOTS) and 
disadvantaged user (COTS) parts of Figure 27. 
VOTS is defined as follows: 
[an] approach at delivering “good enough”68 capability fast enough to take 
advantage of the rapid advances taking place in the information 
technology market. This approach emphasizes reusing and bundling 
interoperable [OTS] components in an architecture optimized for Trusted 
VIRT. [5] 
 
67 OTS should be thought of as a product that is available commercially.  It is “shrink-wrapped” in a 
package and is ready for use once it is out of the box. 
68 Good enough capability refers to the decision to field a network-centric system quickly, and by 
doing so, the PM is accepting a product that does not have all the desired capabilities, but good enough 
capabilities to perform the intended mission.  Future upgrade or refresh cycles will be needed to deliver all 
the desired capabilities. 
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OTS consists of COTS and GOTS69.  The argument for favoring a VOTS 
delivery process comes from the ability of OTS products to reduce the time and cost of 
implementing capability improvements.  OTS leverages existing technology, which is not 
the same thing as reuse, and gives end-user a capability as soon as the system is set-up 
[5]. 
It is important to understand that when OTS items are entered into the data 
repository (ontology and semantic search parameters and uploaded applicable software 
and code) the item becomes GFE.  There will be licensing issues with making OTS items 
GFE, with open source and open licenses that allow vetted developers to use and modify 
those items.  The licensing issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, and will not be 
addressed. 
Figure 27 shows how OTS is the disadvantaged user of the NCSE core diagram 
because it lacks the required security and interconnectivity, but once entered into the data 
repository (as GFE) it becomes part of the top-down approach.  Conversely, GOTS is part 
of the bottom-up approach and can be uploaded to the data repository, but GOTS belongs 
in the disadvantaged user approach if it does not have the right legal interfaces to allow 
developers to modify and innovate with it (e.g., upload to the database repository). 
a. Reuse Components versus Off-the-Shelf 
The focus of the NCAP is to deliver “better” speed-to-capability and 
“better” speed-to-better-capability.  The framework of NCAP advocates both the reuse of 
components and maximizing the use of OTS.  When NCAP stakeholders are presented 
with a decision to acquire OTS components, or reuse existing components, the metrics 
(Anr and Aiv) should be used to determine what approach to take. 
 
 
69 GOTS is a term used for software and hardware products that are either developed by U.S. 
Government agencies or by an external entity, but with funding and specification from the government end-
user.  GOTS software solutions can be shared amongst U.S. Government agencies without additional cost 
[65]. 
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It is possible that the data repository will have COTS/GOTS, and they will 
be called GFE products in its database.  Semantically it could be argued that it is reuse of 
a component vice OTS, but the real issue is that the developer received VIRT (through 
the use of the data repository) that helped in the development of a network-centric 
product. 
b. Commercial and Government Off-the-Shelf 
Using OTS products is advantageous to the DoD because, generally, OTS 
products are cheaper to acquire and do not require development time.  There is time to 
adapt and integrate the components into the overall system.  Thus with OTS, the speed-
to-capability focus of NCAP is maintained. 
In NCAP, the new paradigm will be for PMs to “buy down risk” to cost, 
performance, and schedule by consuming as much pure COTS or GOTS as possible. The 
PM will then document the gap between COTS/GOTS capability and total system 
requirement and invest his new development effort to close the gap.  Of course when the 
PM does that, he should be sure to use a license model that clearly emphasizes 
government purpose rights for re-use.  
c. Information Assurance in Off-the-Shelf Products 
A gap between military requirements and COTS IT products will often 
concern the IA requirements.  Typically COTS products are not especially secure.   
Therefore, DOD will need to invest in developing IA solutions that COTS vendors can 
easily bundle in their future offerings (this is the interface with the disadvantaged user in 
Figure 27). 
A solution for the IA issues of OTS is not addressed in this thesis, but 
network-centric acquisition stakeholders will be able to use the metrics, presented earlier 
in this chapter, to determine if an OTS acquisition will be able to deliver the required 
capabilities, or if a solution using reused components delivers better speed-to-capability 
and better speed-to-better-capability. 
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In this and the previous sections, the concepts of software reuse, a data 
repository, and OTS are discussed.  The next section discusses open systems, licensing 
rights, and Government Purpose Rights (GPR), which are important in continuing to be 
able to develop NCS that are delivered quickly and at a reasonable cost.  Open systems 
and GPR are important in the NCAP framework because if innovation is expected to 
flourish, then developers will need to use open systems that have open source items to 
foster that innovation. 
6. Open Systems and Government Purpose Rights 
The DoD has been pushing open system implementation since 1994 [66].  The 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Continuous Learning (CL) Module Modular 
Open Systems Approach to DoD Acquisition (CLE 013) defines an open system as 
follows: 
[An open system] employs modular design, uses widely supported and 
consensus-based standards for its key interfaces, and has been subjected to 
successful validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of its 
key interfaces. [67] 
Open systems, although not shown in Figure 27, are enablers that allow for the 
integration of the top-down, middle, bottom-up and disadvantaged user parts of the 
NCAP framework. 
 
Figure 30.   Data rights in the Department of Defense Acquisition Framework (From [68]) 
Network-centric acquisition expects systems to be “open”70 and that the DoD 
have “unlimited” purpose rights71, given to the DoD as part of the acquisition contract.  
The purpose right applies mostly to the technical data and computer software, but could 
also apply to hardware designs.  Figure 30 shows the different technical data rights that 
are seen in the DoD acquisition contracts. 
A promising approach for DoD to manage its GPR is by specifying in acquisition 
contracts that it desires a GPR license.  According to G. Tereschuk, a Patent Attorney 
with the U.S. Army Communications/Electronics Life-Cycle Management Command 
(CE/LCMC), a GPR is: 
an Intellectual Property licensing system that is available to DOD 
acquisitions.  [GPR] lies somewhere between the broad Unlimited Rights 
license rights allowing unrestricted Government release of information 
                                                 
70 Open refers to all of the following: open architecture  (which allows all to see inside all or parts of 
the architecture without any proprietary constraints), open system, and open source (source code available 
to the general public with relaxed or non-existent copyright restrictions).  When items are “open” 
developers can reuse and alter the item with little or no licensing restrictions [66]. 
71 Government can not hold unlimited license rights.  Commercial developers always retain some 
ownership of IP they develop. 
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One great advantage of GPR is that it can enforce an open modular design via 
making
According to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
Section
[GPR] means the rights to— 
Use, modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose technical 
Acquiring a GPR, by the DoD, for acquired items, ensures that the DoD will not 
be held
7. Certification and Information Assurance of Network-Centric 
IA concerns are not specifically addressed in this thesis, thus it is important to 
state th
                                                
and the more restrictive Limited or Restricted Rights licensing rights that 
forbid most releases outside the Government.  The [GPR] license affords 
the Government with a comprehensive set of non-commercial license 
rights blending the broad Unlimited Rights and more restrictive Limited or 
Restrictive Rights license terms. [69] 
 GOTS available to developers and GFE72. 
 252.227-7103: 
data within the Government without restriction; and (ii) Release or 
disclose technical data outside the Government and authorize persons to 
whom release or disclosure has been made to use, modify, reproduce, 
release, perform, display, or disclose that data for United States 
government purposes. [54] 
 “hostage”73 to the system designer for the life cycle of the system and that future 
iterations of the system can be worked on in an open, collaborative and competitive 
environment that fosters innovation.   
Products 
at under the NCAP, guidelines for component certification and IA will need to be 
developed by NCAP stakeholders.  These guidelines will need to be clearly understood 
by developers and effectively communicated to all network-centric acquisition 
stakeholders.  This will ensure that developers are able to produce systems that meet 
 
 
72 The data repository would make GFE available to the developers for their use and integration into 
NCS. 
73 Hostage refers to possible high costs paid by the DoD to change systems for which it does not own 
the licensing right.  Effectively being held hostage by the license rights owner. 
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certification and IA requirements for those systems.  Certification and IA integrate the 
top-down, bottom-up, middle approach, and disadvantaged user to the NCSE core (the 
trunk) of the NCAP framework (Figure 27). 
8. Relating NCAP Framework 
The NCAP framework, as related to the NCSE core (Figure 27), is made of 
several systems and approaches (e.g., processes) that overlap and integrate in order to 
operate effectively.  For example, a critical process is the need to reuse components 
(components are the network-centric applications in the bottom-up approach and the 
components from the data repository in the top-down approach of Figure 27).  In order to 
reuse components and innovate, a collaborative development environment is needed 
where the reused components can be modified, tested, and if needed integrated into new 
systems.  The data repository is another core part of NCAP (part of the top-down 
approach of Figure 27) that has the components that can be reused.  In addition to the 
data repository, the e-Biz marketplace provides a marketplace (for sale of network-centric 
applications) and dating service (to match customers and developers); this is part of the 
top-down approach of Figure 27.  Components can also be acquired through an OTS 
process (disadvantaged user in Figure 27).  The network-centric “glue,” open systems, 
open license, GPR, certification and IA enable the NCAP and make up the core part of 
Figure 27 that integrates all the branches. 
The next section of this chapter will present the recommendations of a study by 
the DSB for the implementation of an acquisition model for IT that will replace the DAS 
model presented in Figure 13 of Chapter III.  This is being presented as a foundation for 
NCAP and DoD Directive 5000.01 recommendations. 
F. ACQUISITION MODEL FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC SYSTEMS 
The NCAP is a SE based process that can be used to develop network-centric 
components.  Chapter III discussed DoD acquisition, and presented in detail the Little “a” 
acquisition process, see Figure 9. 
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The framework for NCAP gives a “close-in” view of how network-centric 
acquisition will work.  Stepping back and looking at the NCAP at the DAS level, it is 
clear to see that the current iteration of the DAS (Figure 13) does not support NCAP.  
The current DAS model is slow, serial and designed to acquire large military systems.  
The NCAP framework requires a fast, parallel, and iterative approach to acquisition. 
A recent report by the Defense Science Board74 stated that: 
The conventional DOD acquisition process is too long and too 
cumbersome to fit the needs of the many systems that require continuous 
changes and upgrades. [50] 
In the same report, the DSB, recommended that a new acquisition and 
requirements development process for IT systems be developed.  The DSB provided an 
acquisition process that is modeled on commercial best practices [50].  The new IT 
acquisition process proposed by the DSB is shown in Figure 31, and can be incorporated 
easily into the NCAP framework even though the DSB proposed model focuses on IT 
acquisition, while this thesis focuses on NCS acquisition.  The new acquisition process 
fits the NCAP framework because they both focus on fast, parallel, and iterative 
development.  In addition, the NCAP process focuses on acquiring the “glue” of network-
centricity—described earlier as network-centric IT. 
For brevity and ease of use, the new acquisition and requirements development 
process for IT will henceforth be referred to as the “Network-Centric System Acquisition 
Model” (NCSAM). 
The following subsection describes, at a high level, the operation of the 
NCSAM.75 
 
74 The DSB provides independent advice and recommendations to senior DoD personnel on scientific, 
technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special interest to the DoD 
(http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/charter.htm). 
75 For more detailed understanding of the NCSAM, read Chapter 6 of the DSB report [50]. 
 Figure 31.   New Acquisition and Requirements Development Process for IT Systems or 
Network-Centric System Acquisition Model (From [50]). 
The NCSAM is an agile process that is focused on delivering capabilities in 18-
month increments, and leverages the advantages of modern IT practices [50].  NCSAM is 
divided into four phases and each phase begins with a decision point that requires MDA 
approval. 
The first two phases of the NCSAM the Business Case Analysis and Development 
(BCAD) phase and the Architecture Development and Risk Reduction (ADRR) phase are 
very similar to the MSA, TD, and EMD phases described in Chapter III.  The noticeable 
difference is that the NCSAM model exits the Milestone Build Decision (similar to 
Milestone B decision) with an acquisition strategy and acquisition program baseline for a 
certain number of capability releases, and with full funding for all future releases76. 
The next phase, the Development and Demonstration (D&D) phase builds and 
delivers operational capability for a set number of releases.  For each release, the PM 
updates the system design and must receive MDA approval prior to beginning each 
iterative release.  After three iterations of a release and a successful IOT&E and positive 
decision by the MDA77, the system is fielded [50]. 
                                                 
76 Full funding for all releases means that funds are appropriated for all approved iterative releases of 
capability, thus reducing the risk of funding cuts in subsequent budgeting years. 
77 The positive MDA decision is based on meeting all the requirements for the specific release. 
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Subsequent releases will have to again go through an MDA decision point, in 
order to ensure that the future releases are based on mature technologies, have an 
acquisition strategy and baseline approved by the MDA, and remain fully funded. 
The last phase is the Operations and Support (O&S) phase that is very similar to 
the OS phase described in Chapter III. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The NCAP, as proposed, would incorporate all that was discussed in sections A 
thru C of this chapter, and use the acquisition model proposed by the DSB [50] and 
briefly described in section D of this chapter.  The focus of the NCAP is to facilitate the 
speed-to-capability and speed-to-better-capability of network-centric applications by 
acquiring the “glue” of network-centricity.  By favoring speed-to-capability, NCS would 
be able to take advantage of cutting edge technology, because with short development 
and release cycles, the technology would not be obsolete when it is ready to be deployed 
to the warfighters.   
In summary, the NCAP  
 can be related to the NCSE core tree diagram  
 focuses on reuse of existing components that reduce acquisition development 
time 
 maximizes the use of collaborative development environments that advocate 
open source and competition 
 uses a data repository used to search for existing items to reuse 
 uses an e-Biz marketplace to transacts its business, to match consumers and 
developers, and review products 
 advocates the use of OTS products by encouraging PM to buy down as much 
capability risk with OTS 
 provides open systems to developers as GFE and maximizes GPR in 
contracting language 
 uses regulation to facilitate certification, V&V, testing, and IA for developed 
applications. 
 
It is important to note that the NCAP is network-centric and facilitates network-
centric “business” operations.  The NCAP framework can be mapped back to the central 
tenets of NCW, discussed in Chapter II, to show its network-centric nature.  Figure 32 is 
a visual description of NCW, where the info-structure supports a series of concentric 
rings of network-centric capabilities that ultimately support full spectrum dominance. 
 
Figure 32.   Network-Centric Warfare Framework (From [70]) 
The reuse of components facilitates product development and is analogous to 
“speed of command” in Figure 32.  The collaborative development environment is 
analogous to the “info-structure” and “shared battlespace awareness” of Figure 32.  The 
data repository is analogous to the “information superiority” of Figure 32.  The e-Biz 
marketplace is analogous to the “shared battlespace awareness” and “shared 
commander’s intent” of Figure 32.  The use of OTS, GFE, and open systems is analogous 
to “speed of command” of Figure 32.  The NCAP regulations for certification, V&V, 
testing, and IA are analogous to “shared commander’s intent” of Figure 32.  Lastly, the 
users of NCAP will have innovative products that are analogous to “self-
synchronization” of Figure 32. 
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The NCAP, if implemented and scaled correctly, would deliver “good enough” 
capabilities to the end-user faster, with more frequent incremental capability 
improvements, and at a reduced cost. 
The NCAP should be adopted by the DoD and used in conjunction with the DSB 
proposed NCSAM.  Using the NCAP in the DoD acquisition framework of the NCSAM 
would help deliver “better” speed-to-capability and “better” speed-to-better-capability. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis has covered a wide swath of information from the network-centric 
world, and has applied it to a narrow part of network-centric acquisition, specifically 
introducing and detailing the Network-Centric Acquisition Process (NCAP). 
The chapters of this thesis were structured in a manner that would support the 
presentation of the NCAP.  Chapter I provided an overview of the thesis, discussed the 
underlying reasons for developing the NCAP, and the expected benefits of the study.  
Chapter II gave an overview of network-centricity, describing its origins, the underlying 
theory, and defining what a Network-Centric System (NCS) is.  Chapter III gave an 
overview of Defense Acquisition and described in detail its different parts (PPBES, 
JCIDS, and the DAS).  Chapter IV presented several different SE approaches, described 
in detail a generic SE approach to acquisition, and mapped the generic SE approach to 
acquisition to the DoD acquisition process.  Based on the foundations of Chapters I–IV, 
Chapter V presented the NCAP and a detailed explanation of its framework.  This 
Chapter gives conclusions and recommendations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In order to correctly enable Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), the DoD needs to 
acquire NCS that continue to provide “better” speed-to-capability but “better” speed-to-
better-capability.  NCS are very diverse and can range from a large ship, to a small 
unmanned aerial vehicle, but the common thread that makes them network-centric is their 
ability to harness the power of the network to gain information and decision superiority 
over an adversary.  What allows NCS to harness the power of the network is the 
backbone of Information Technology (IT) software.  The NCAP provides an efficient and 




The current DoD acquisition system is slow, serial in nature, delivers large 
“chunks” of capability at once, is expensive, has slow refresh cycles, and encourages 
stovepiped processes and systems to exist. The urgency of GWOT makes it critical to 
improve the DAS so that it can anticipate threats and quickly respond to those threats via 
the fast development and fielding of new capabilities.  The NCAP provides an alternative 
for faster acquisition, by focusing on delivering “better” speed-to-capability and “better” 
speed-to-better-capability while incorporating current DoD network-centric guidance and 
industry best practices. 
The NCAP framework incorporates metrics that measure the processes’ ability to 
deliver “better” speed-to-capability and better speed-to-“better”-capability.  The 
framework also incorporates industry best practices such as component reuse, 
collaborative environment, acquisition data repository, electronic business marketplace, 
and OTS components. 
The implementation of the NCAP will require fresh interpretations of DoD 
Directive 5000.01, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and other governing directives.  
The DSB, in one of its 2009 reports, proposed new acquisition and requirements 
development process for IT (see Figure 31) [50] and was referred to in Chapter V as the 
Network-Centric System Acquisition Model (NCSAM).  The NCSAM will provide the 
ideal framework on which the NCAP can operate because it supports quick iterative 
development cycles with frequent capability upgrades. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made in order to help improve DoD 
acquisition of NCS. 
1. Develop and Field Test the Network-centric Acquisition Process 
The primary recommendation of this thesis is that the NCAP, whose framework 




centric capabilities.  The adoption of the NCAP should be done in a small-scale, 
acquisition environment, or prototype venue, and then slowly, and iteratively, scaled to 
larger acquisitions. 
The concepts and theories for the NCAP framework were taken from industry 
best practices, but these concepts need to be verified to ensure that they work in a DoD 
acquisition framework.  It is recommended that the NCAP be used on a small acquisition, 
be it a test scenario, and then expanded if successful acquisitions are achieved. 
When implementing the NCAP, it will be important to use the NCAP metrics, 
discussed in Chapter V, that measure “better” speed-to-capability, Anr, and better speed-
to-“better”-capability, Aiv as a means to objectively evaluate the acquisition. 
It is expected that the NCAP will not be implemented with its framework fully 
operational (i.e., data repository, e-Biz marketplace, or development environment 
working), but this should not slow or halt the implementation of the NCAP, because it 
will be evolutionary.  As NCAP framework items become operational, they should be 
incorporated into the operational version of the NCAP. 
2. Change the Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoD 
Directive 5000.01 
DoD should implement the recommendations of the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) March 2009 report, Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the 
Acquisition of Information Technology [50], that recommended that DoD Directive 
5000.01 use a new acquisition process for IT, called NCSAM framework in Chapter V 
(see Figure 31). 
By implementing the DSB recommendations, the DoD will give the NCAP an 




3. Long-term Development of the Network-Centric Data Repository 
The DoD should begin creating a network-centric data repository that mirrors the 
search and ontology structures of the SHARE repository, described in Chapter V and in 
Ontology-based Solutions for Software Reuse [64].  The creation of the data repository 
will need to begin slowly and on a small scale. 
The creation of the data repository will be a challenging and difficult task.  It will 
require clear and well thought out guidance on how to enter, classify, and store repository 
items.  It is possible that the network-centric data repository will not be operational until 
several iterations, with a prototype NCAP data repository, are completed. 
4. Framework of Network-Centric Collaborative Development 
Environment 
Further studies should be conducted by the DoD to determine the best framework 
to use in the network-centric collaborative development environment.  The framework 
will include the development environment to use, the standard software interfaces, the 
minimum IA requirements, and the licensing rights requirements. 
Forge.mil should serve as a model, prototype, or even as the development 
environment to be used when implementing the early versions of the NCAP. 
5. e-Biz Marketplace Structure and Business Rules 
Further studies should be conducted by the DoD to determine the best framework 
to use in the e-Biz marketplace.  The requirements for the e-Biz marketplace were 
discussed in Chapter V, but consultation and collaboration with e-Biz marketplace 
industry leaders (e.g., eBay and Amazon) could help create an effective DoD e-Biz 
marketplace, or prototype, on which to test the NCAP. 
6. Network-centric Acquisition Stakeholder Education and Training 
DoD should use the material in this thesis and references to create a course that 




acquisition process, and the NCAP.  The Naval Postgraduate School could plan on using 
this thesis and references for course material in the Network-Centric Systems 
Engineering courses. 
This thesis has covered a wide array of information, starting with network-
centricity, to the Defense Acquisition Process, through Systems Engineering, and finally 
into the NCAP.  The NCAP is a new and revolutionary process for acquiring network-
centric systems, but it needs to be tested in order to objectively know if it will deliver on 
its promises of speed-to-capability and speed-to-better-capability.  What is certain is that 
NCAP is critical for network-centric warfare and network centric operations in this time 
of Global War on Terror.  
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APPENDIX:  GENERIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
A review of the SE processes standard and capability model, discussed in Chapter 
IV, Section C, shows that, although each is essentially different, all are very similar 
because the general underlying process is a common thread through all of them.  An 
important part of SE is the use of multidisciplinary Integrated Product/Project Teams 
(IPT). 
According to the DoD Integrated Product and Process Development Handbook 
[71], an IPT is: 
a multidisciplinary group of people, who are collectively responsible for 
delivering a defined product or process.  The IPT is composed of people 
who plan, execute, and implement life-cycle decisions for the system 
being acquired.  It includes empowered representatives (stakeholders) 
from all of the functional areas involved with the product—all who have a 
stake in the success of the program, such as design, manufacturing, Test 
and Evaluation (T&E), and logistics personnel, and, especially, the 
customer.  Because the activities relative to a system’s acquisition change 
and evolve over its life-cycle, the roles of various IPTs and IPT members 
evolve.  When the team is dealing with an area that requires a specific 
expertise, [a Subject Matter Expert (SME]), the role of the member with 
that expertise will predominate; however, other team members’ input 
should be integrated into the overall life-cycle design of the product.  
Some teams may assemble to address a specific problem and then become 
inactive or even disband after accomplishing their tasks. 
The IPTs help effectively translate user-defined capabilities into operational 
system specifications that are consistent with cost, schedule, and performance constraints.  
IPTs facilitate meeting cost and performance objectives from product concept 
development through production, including field support by using the key tenet of 
multidisciplinary teamwork.  Multidisciplinary teamwork allows for more effective 
communication between stakeholders, so that project decisions can be made more 
efficiently and effectively with an understanding of overall system impact.  IPTs are 
crucial in the SE approach because they allow the stakeholders to effectively 
communicate and resolve issues that if not addressed early in the design process can have 
a negative impact on the cost, schedule, and performance of the system. 
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Figure 33 shows a generic SE model with a view of the ideal level of effort 
(work) and duration of the different SE process phases.  Each phase is explained, along 
with “ideal” people type per phase78.  This model will be used as the generic model 
which other models could be transposed on and related. 
A. “X” PHASE—THE IDEA 
The acquisition process begins with a need by a customer, “X” in Figure 33.  “X” 
is the big idea, concept, or dream, of a system and consists of a generic top-down view. 
1. “X” Phase People 
These people are the “big picture” thinkers, visionaries, and dreamers.  “X” 
people take the end-user needs, analyze them, and are capable of correctly describing the 
capability gap—the need—that requires a materiel solution.  Since they understand the 
“big picture,” they do not concern themselves with the intricate details of the systems 
they require. 
B. “A” PHASE—CONCEPT DESIGN 
The big picture architecture, top-down view of the system, is developed in the 
“A” phase of this SE process.  The system developer takes the customer’s need “X,” and 
translates them into a concept design and preliminary architecture design, which help 
define stakeholder requirements.  Correctly eliciting system requirements early in the 
process, can help reduce the overall cost, determine a more accurate schedule, and ensure 
desired performance of the system.  Careful coordination is required among the 
stakeholders to ensure that conceptual design tradeoffs are correctly analyzed and 
implemented, and that defined requirements and concepts are properly documented.  In 
this phase, concept design and agreement of the acceptance test is carried out. 
 
78 This SE model and “ideal” people types was developed by Dr. Lawrence Goshorn in the 1960s as 
the Chairman of General Automation Incorporated.  This is a different perspective on the SE model 
described by ISO/IEC 15288, Blanchard and Fabrycky, and Buede [72] [73]. 
 
Figure 33.   Overview of Systems Engineering Phases with Cost and Time (From [74]) 
1. “A” Phase People 
“A” people interact constantly with the customer, “X” types, thus “A” people 
usually have marketing, business, and detail design experience79.  “A” people need to be 
able to effectively communicate with the customer to correctly elicit the system 
requirements.  “A” people need to also interact with “B” people, to make sure what they 
plan is technically feasible, and therefore “A” people with technical backgrounds 
(typically were a “B” person previously) are more successful.  
C. “B” PHASE—DETAILED DESIGN 
The “B” phase takes big picture preliminary system design architecture and 
breaks it up into system, sub-system, component, and system detailed specifications (e.g., 
turns architectures into detailed engineering, physics, terms, specifications, etc.).  The 
detailed design phase, or detailed architecture design phase80, uses the concept design 
                                                 
79 Design experience refers to technical understanding of the type of system to be developed. 
80 Preliminary architecture is done in the “A” phase. 
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from “A” phase to create a detailed system design.  Exact specifications for the system, 
its sub-systems, and interfaces emerge and the bottom-up engineering details are created 
using the top-down architecture (from “A”) and the details of how the top-down and 
bottom-up designs will be integrated.  Rapid prototyping is done in this phase. 
Test and evaluation plans are created, and detailed acceptance tests are specified, 
in order to show the stakeholders that the “X” phase needs are met. 
1. “B” Phase People   
“B” phase people are engineers with technical experience that push the 
technology boundaries with a “can do” attitude that is at times overly optimistic.  “B” 
people interface with “A” and “C”; therefore they need to technically commit to “A” and 
make sure the plan is feasible for “C” people and encourage “C” people that this system 
is doable (show them the system vision). 
2. “C” Phase—Implementation 
This phase begins implementation of the system design as detailed sub-system 
designs are finalized and sub-systems are built. The majority of the work is conducted 
during this phase as the system(s) are built at a certain rate over time.  The qualification 
system for the acceptance tests is further designed (from the detailed acceptance tests 
design from “B”) and implemented in this phase.  At the end of “C,” each subsystem and 
the qualification system is tested. 
a.  “C” Phase People   
“C” phase people are also engineers. They are experts in the sub-system 
technical areas.  The best “C” phase people often move to work in the  “B” phase. 
3. “D” Phase—System Integration 
System integration involves the integration of the built sub-system(s) to make up 




                                                
designed and built systems, and testing is accomplished through the acceptance test, to 
show that the designed and built system works, and that it meets the stakeholder’s 
requirements. 
The people from the “A, B, and C” phases are involved in the debugging of the 
integrated system in the “D” phase.  The pace of this phase is fast and hectic because of 
the “unknown” and “known” issues that develop as the systems are integrated, and the 
timeline for product delivery gets tight. 
The integrated system is demonstrated to the stakeholders, in order to ensure that 
the requirements of the “X” phase are met.  There will be rework and changes to the 
system as the stakeholders (customers and “A, B, and C” phase personnel) negotiate the 
acceptance criteria for the final production system81.  Stakeholder requirements are 
compared to the capabilities delivered by the systems during Verification and Validation 
(V&V or acceptance test), and negotiation of the percentage of the final product end-user 
requirements that are met. 
A perfect SE process could ensure that all stakeholders are involved in design and 
production decisions, and that the capability tradeoffs are acceptable, and understood, by 
all stakeholders.  The integration of different sub-systems can be challenging and a lot of 
effort will be spent mitigating integration issues.  By keeping all informed of the 
tradespace decision process, the risk of getting to the “D” phase and integrating a product 
that is not acceptable to either the customer or other stakeholders is greatly reduced. 
a. “D” Phase People   
The “D” phase people are the leaders from the “A, B, and C” phases that 
understand the sub-systems and how they will interact when integrated into the whole 
system.  They are determined to make the system work, and will work night and day to 
achieve successful systems. 
 
81 Acceptance test criteria should be agreed in earlier phases. 
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4. “E” Phase—Clean-up 
The clean-up phase is the last part of the SE process, before production, where the 
system manuals (training, maintenance, and operation) are developed, delivered, and 
training is conducted for the end-users. 
As the system proceeds past the delivery phase, production of the item continues 
(in the “F” phase), as well as operational use (“G” phase), system refinement, upgrades 
(“H” phase), retirement (“I” phase), and disposal (“J” phase). 
a. “E” Phase People 
“E” phase people like to “clean-up” the system design by documenting 
configurations, developing end-user training documents, and cleaning up design issues.  
These people usually are writers and enjoy developing documentation, for example 
training documents, etc. 
5. “Other” Phases 
For systems that have multiple units that are delivered to the customer, there is the 
continued production of the system (with some delivery timeline). 
There is also the operational use of the product (“G”) as well as the maintenance 
(“H”) and repair to the system.  In addition, there is system refinement (“H”), as planned 
and unplanned, but necessary, upgrades are incorporated into the system design. 
There is the planning for system retirement (“I”) and disposal (“J”) used once the 
system has exceeded its useful life. 
a. “Other” Phase People (“F,” “G,” “H,” “I,” “J”) 
These people are mostly life-cycle support personnel who carry out 
production, ensure maintenance, perform upgrades, provide support, and who will plan 
for retirement, and disposal of the system. 
The previous two sections describe the different SE process model.  The 
next section will address the mapping of the generic SE approach to the DoD Acquisition 
Process. 
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